University of Connecticut

OpenCommons@UConn
Connecticut Law Review

School of Law

2018

Lessons from Wynne: Why New York City’s Internally Consistent
Income Tax Nonetheless Violates the Dormant Commerce Clause
Alexander G. Andrews

Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review

Recommended Citation
Andrews, Alexander G., "Lessons from Wynne: Why New York City’s Internally Consistent Income Tax
Nonetheless Violates the Dormant Commerce Clause" (2018). Connecticut Law Review. 386.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review/386

CONNECTICUT

LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 50

DECEMBER 2018

NUMBER 4

Note
Lessons from Wynne: Why New York City’s Internally
Consistent Income Tax Nonetheless Violates the
Dormant Commerce Clause
ALEXANDER G. ANDREWS
In Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, the United States Supreme
Court held unconstitutional Maryland’s refusal to allow a taxpayer to credit income
taxes paid to other states against a purportedly local income tax. This holding could have
important consequences for similar income tax schemes, namely New York’s. This Note
analyzes the New York City income tax in light of Wynne. Specifically, this Note
evaluates the constitutionality of the New York City income tax when viewed in tandem
with the State income tax (of which it is a part) in response to an as applied challenge to
the law. It concludes that the State’s refusal to allow taxpayers a credit for income taxes
paid to other states against the New York City income tax is unconstitutional.
Part I of this Note examines the history and roots of the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine. Part II narrows the discussion to the Court’s application of the dormant
Commerce Clause to state taxation of interstate commerce. Part III explains the intense
opposition to the dormant Commerce Clause by a minority of justices on the Court. Part
IV analyzes Wynne with an emphasis on its application to the New York income tax
statute. Part V explains that while the New York City income tax is internally consistent
and non-discriminatory when viewed in isolation, that description is irrelevant to the
constitutional analysis. This Part demonstrates that the New York City income tax is an
integral part of the New York State income tax despite its label, which misleads the nondiscrimination inquiry.
Through examining the Court’s discrimination case law and the relevant scholarly
literature, this Note concludes that the internally consistent New York City income tax,
when viewed in tandem with the New York State income tax (of which it is an organic
part), nonetheless discriminates against interstate commerce and therefore violates the
dormant Commerce Clause. This Note also analyzes general principles of international
taxation and the Court’s teaching in the sales and use tax context to determine that a
residence state must grant a credit for income taxes paid to a source state to alleviate any
resulting double taxation.
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Lessons from Wynne: Why New York City’s Internally
Consistent Income Tax Nonetheless Violates the
Dormant Commerce Clause
ALEXANDER G. ANDREWS *
INTRODUCTION
In Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, the United
States Supreme Court held that Maryland’s refusal to allow a credit for
income taxes paid to other states against the county portion of the State
income tax violated the dormant Commerce Clause.1 While no other state
has an income tax statute identical to that of Maryland, the Wynne holding
could have important consequences for similar income tax schemes,
particularly New York’s. This Note analyzes the New York City income
tax in light of Wynne. Specifically, this Note evaluates the constitutionality
of the New York City income tax when viewed in tandem with the State
income tax (of which it is a part) in response to an as applied challenge to
the law. It concludes that the State’s refusal to allow taxpayers a credit for
income taxes paid to other states against the New York City income tax2 is
unconstitutional. The important questions this Note resolves are that: (1) an
internally consistent tax may nonetheless be discriminatory, and (2) states
taxing income based on residence must yield to states taxing income based
on source by providing a credit to offset any double taxation that results
when two sovereigns exercise their legitimate taxing powers.
Part I of this Note examines the history and roots of the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine. Part II narrows the discussion to the Court’s
*
University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2019; University of Connecticut, cum
laude, B.A. 2016. I am eminently grateful to Professor Ruth Mason, Professor Walter Hellerstein,
Professor Edward A. Zelinsky, Steven N. Wlodychak, Timothy P. Noonan, Robert D. Plattner, and Dr.
James W. Wetzler for reviewing an earlier draft of this Note and providing helpful commentary. I
would like to extend further acknowledgements to my colleagues on the Connecticut Law Review—
particularly our Editor-in-Chief Andrew Ammirati, Managing Editor Michael Rondon, and Assistant
Managing Editor Elizabeth Santovasi—for their meticulous editing. Moreover, I am incredibly honored
that the Judge John R. Brown Scholarship Foundation selected this Note as a finalist for the 2018
Brown Award for Excellence in Legal Writing. Most importantly, I would like to thank my parents
(Corina and Drew Andrews), grandparents (Marie Andrews, Monika Norberg, and Forrest Norberg),
and sister (Nicole Andrews) for their love and support in all of my endeavors. This Note is dedicated to
my late grandfather George Andrews, who passed away shortly after my 1L year. The views expressed
in this Note are solely those of the Author. Any errors or omissions are mine.
1
Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1792 (2015).
2
See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1310 (McKinney 2018) (listing permissible credits against income taxes
imposed by cities, which does not include income taxes paid to other states).
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application of the dormant Commerce Clause to state taxation of interstate
commerce. Part III explains the intense opposition to the dormant
Commerce Clause by a minority of justices on the Court. This Part
specifically explores the concerns of the late Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice
Clarence Thomas, and recently confirmed Justice Neil Gorsuch. Part IV
analyzes Wynne with an emphasis on its application to the New York
income tax statute.
Part V explains that while the New York City income tax is internally
consistent and non-discriminatory when viewed in isolation, that
description is irrelevant to the constitutional analysis. This Part
demonstrates that the New York City income tax is an integral part of the
New York State income tax despite its label, which misleads the
non-discrimination inquiry.
Through examining the Court’s discrimination case law and the
relevant scholarly literature, this Part concludes that the internally
consistent New York City income tax, when viewed in tandem with the
New York State income tax (of which it is an organic part), nonetheless
discriminates against interstate commerce and therefore violates the
dormant Commerce Clause. Part V analyzes general principles of
international taxation and the Court’s teaching in the sales and use tax
context to determine that a residence state must grant a credit for income
taxes paid to a source state to alleviate any resulting double taxation. This
Note concludes that, in narrow circumstances, New York’s refusal to grant
a credit for income taxes paid to other states against the New York City
income tax violates the dormant Commerce Clause.
I.

THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE

Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution grants
Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, . . . among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”3
The Commerce Clause expressly grants Congress the authority to
regulate interstate commerce,4 which allows it to preempt the states from
doing so.5 The United States Supreme Court has “further” interpreted the
3

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This Note hereinafter refers to this constitutional provision’s
interstate feature as the “Commerce Clause.” While interesting and sometimes relevant in other tax
cases, the Foreign Commerce Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause are not within the scope of this
Note. For an in-depth examination of the Indian Commerce Clause and state taxation, see Richard D.
Pomp, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Indian Commerce Clause and State Taxation, 63 TAX LAW. 897
(2010).
4
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5
See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992) (citation omitted)
(“Congress authorized the Secretary of Labor to set mandatory occupational safety and health standards
applicable to all businesses affecting interstate commerce and thereby brought the Federal government
into a field that traditionally had been occupied by the States.”).
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Commerce Clause to “contain a[n] . . . [implicit] negative command,
known as the dormant Commerce Clause, [which] prohibit[s]” the states
from impermissibly burdening interstate commerce “even when Congress
has failed to legislate on the subject.”6 Consistent with the concept of
preemption, however, Congress may consent to burdensome state
regulation of interstate commerce that would, in the absence of
congressional action, offend the dormant Commerce Clause.7
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine traces its roots to the seminal
case of Gibbons v. Ogden,8 even though it would appear that the Court did
not explicitly use the term until 1945.9 The doctrine does not bar all state
regulation of interstate commerce; it merely precludes states from enacting
6

Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1794; see also RICHARD D. POMP, STATE & LOCAL TAXATION 1-4 (8th ed.
2015) (“[T]he Commerce Clause does not explicitly proscribe state regulation or taxation of interstate
commerce . . . . Th[e] [dormant Commerce Clause] doctrine asserts that some constraint on state
taxation or regulation is required by the policies underlying the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding that
Congress neither prohibited nor preempted the legislation at issue.”). This Note hereinafter refers to the
Commerce Clause’s implicit negative command as the “dormant Commerce Clause.”
7
See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429–30 (1946) (“Obviously Congress’
purpose [in enacting the McCarran Act] was broadly to give support to the existing and future state
systems for regulating and taxing the business of insurance. This was done in two ways. One was by
removing obstructions which might be thought to flow from its own power, whether dormant or
exercised, except as otherwise expressly provided in the Act itself or in future legislation.”). In Wynne,
Justice Scalia criticized this concept. See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1808 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted) (“The clearest sign that the negative Commerce Clause is a judicial fraud is the utterly
illogical holding that congressional consent enables States to enact laws that would otherwise constitute
impermissible burdens upon interstate commerce. How could congressional consent lift a constitutional
prohibition?”). His argument is rather strange. The dormant Commerce Clause is implicit, whereas the
Commerce Clause is an explicit grant to Congress. Of course Congress can permit states to enact laws
that would otherwise violate the dormant Commerce Clause—the Commerce Clause expressly
authorizes it to do so.
8
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 13 (1824) (explaining that the states have no general
concurrent commerce powers and that Congress’ commerce authority reigns supreme over that of the
states in certain circumstances); Norman R. Williams, The Dormant Commerce Clause: Why Gibbons
v. Ogden Should be Restored to the Canon, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 817, 823 (2005) (emphasis added)
(“But what about all the various regulatory laws, such as health inspection laws, that the states had
adopted? They were manifestly not adopted pursuant to the state’s taxation authority. Did not their
existence and uncontested validity demonstrate that the states retained the power to regulate interstate
commerce? [Chief Justice] Marshall’s answer was no, and his explanation formed the early framework
for assessing dormant Commerce Clause challenges.”); POMP, supra note 6, at 1-5 (“In Gibbons v.
Ogden . . . Chief Justice Marshall in dictum . . . supported a reading of the [Commerce] Clause that
would grant Congress broad power to regulate ‘commerce which concerns more states than one,’ while
allowing a state to ‘regulate its police, its domestic trade, and to govern its own citizens,’ even if that
regulation had an impact on interstate commerce.”).
9
After searching both Westlaw and Lexis using the search term “dormant Commerce Clause” and
the filter “United States Supreme Court cases,” the earliest case in which the term appears is Hill v. St.
of Fla. ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 547–48 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
(“The same regard for the harmonious balance of our federal system, whereby the States may protect
local interests despite the dormant Commerce Clause, allows State legislation for the protection of local
interests so long as Congress has not supplanted local regulation either by a regulation of its own or by
an unmistakable indication that there is to be no regulation at all.”).
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10

laws that impermissibly burden, interfere with, or discriminate against11
interstate commerce. The Court has expounded on the theory that the
primary concern of the Commerce Clause is economic protectionism—that
is, laws that act as tariffs on interstate commerce.12 Some justices have
vigorously disputed this theory,13 but the majority of the Court remains
comfortable with such an interpretation of this constitutional provision.14
In a dormant Commerce Clause inquiry, courts subject state laws that
facially discriminate against interstate commerce to strict scrutiny review.15
A facially discriminatory law will survive this level of scrutiny only if it
serves a legitimate local purpose that the state cannot further by less
discriminatory means.16 Such laws are rare and will almost always fail the
strict scrutiny test, thus violating the dormant Commerce Clause.17 More
common are facially non-discriminatory state laws that, in practical
application, affect interstate commerce. Courts effectively subject these
laws to a rational basis level of scrutiny18 and they often survive.19 Most
10

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100–01 (1994).
12
See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1794 (“By prohibiting States from discriminating against or imposing
excessive burdens on interstate commerce without congressional approval, [the dormant Commerce
Clause] strikes at one of the chief evils that led to the adoption of the Constitution, namely, state tariffs
and other laws that burdened interstate commerce.”); W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186,
192 (1994) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273–74 (1988)) (“Th[e]
‘negative’ aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits economic protectionism—that is, regulatory
measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors . . . .”);
POMP, supra note 6, at 1-4 (“The Court has recently described the dormant Commerce Clause as
serving the ‘purpose of preventing a State from retreating into economic isolation or jeopardizing the
welfare of the Nation as a whole, as it would do if it were free to place burdens on the flow of
commerce across its borders that commerce wholly within those borders would not bear.’ The
provision thus ‘reflect[s] a central concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the
Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid
the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later
among the States under the Articles of Confederation.’”).
13
See infra Part III.
14
In Wynne, the only justices that indicated a willingness to revisit the doctrine were Justice
Scalia and Justice Thomas. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1808 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1811 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); see also POMP, supra note 6, at 1-5 (“Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas are the two sitting
justices most willing to re-examine the doctrine.”).
15
Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 100–01.
16
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 581 (1997).
17
But see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (“The evidence in this case amply supports
the District Court’s findings that Maine’s [facially discriminatory] ban on the importation of live
baitfish serves legitimate local purposes that could not adequately be served by available
nondiscriminatory alternatives.”).
18
See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.”).
19
See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 339 (2008) (“State laws frequently
survive this Pike scrutiny. . . .”).
11
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THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATE TAXATION

Taxation is a common form of state regulation of interstate commerce.
Consequently, the United States Supreme Court has applied the dormant
Commerce Clause in numerous cases questioning the constitutionality of
state taxation. The application of the doctrine to state taxation has
substantially evolved.21
A. The Court’s Early Formalism Regarding State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce
Initially, the Court held that state taxation of interstate commerce “in
any form” offended the Commerce Clause.22 The Court’s holding in
Leloup v. Port of Mobile is an example of a dormant Commerce Clause
holding in a state tax case prior to the Court’s actual adoption of the term.23
As Justice Samuel Alito explained in Wynne, the doctrine certainly has
“deep roots”24 in the context of state taxation.25
One year prior to Leloup, the Court rendered an even more expansive
decision. In Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, the Court held that
state taxation of interstate commerce is unconstitutional even when the
state levies the same amount of tax on intrastate commerce.26 Over time,
the Court retreated from this per se formalistic approach, simply adopting
another formal methodology.
This new methodology led the Court to hold unconstitutional “direct”
state taxation of interstate commerce, such as direct taxation of gross

20

Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
See POMP, supra note 6, at 1-9 to 1-21 (detailing the evolution of the Court’s state tax dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
22
See Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888) (“In our opinion such a construction of
the Constitution leads to the conclusion that no State has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in
any form, whether by way of duties laid on the transportation of the subjects of that commerce, or on
the receipts derived from that transportation, or on the occupation or business of carrying it on, and the
reason is that such taxation is a burden on that commerce, and amounts to a regulation of it, which
belongs solely to Congress.”).
23
Id.
24
Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 (2015).
25
Never one to miss an opportunity to use his caustic wit to emphasize a point, the late Justice
Scalia compared these “roots” to “weeds.” See id. at 1808 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (responding to the
majority’s argument that the dormant Commerce Clause “has deep roots” by countering, “[s]o it does,
like many weeds”).
26
See Robbins v. Shelby Cty. Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 497 (1887) (emphasis added)
(“Interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, even though the same amount of tax should be laid on
domestic commerce, or that which is carried on solely within the state.”).
21
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27

receipts from interstate commerce and direct taxation of freight
transported in interstate commerce.28 Having adopted the rubric of direct
taxation, the Court upheld an indirect franchise tax measured by gross
receipts from interstate commerce.29 Such a tax is substantively identical to
a direct tax on gross receipts, but the Court honored form over substance—
which, as discussed below, is the inverse of its thinking today.30
B. The Erosion of Formalism: The Multiple Taxation Analysis
Over time, the Court’s formalistic thinking began to erode as new
justices joined the Court. This erosion began in 1927 with Justice Harlan
Stone’s dissent in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania.31 Justice Stone argued that the
formalistic approach that the Court employed had lost its value.32 He
decried the formula as rigid and difficult to apply.33
While in the minority in Di Santo, Justice Stone shortly thereafter
expressed his anti-formalism in his “famous”34 Western Live Stock v.
Bureau of Revenue majority opinion.35 The tax at issue in Western Live
Stock was a New Mexico franchise tax measured by gross receipts.36 The
appellant, Western Live Stock, published, edited, and prepared a livestock
trade journal solely in that State.37 The question in the case was whether
New Mexico could constitutionally tax Western Live Stock’s receipts from
out-of-state advertisers.38 Under previous precedent, the Court would have
upheld the tax solely because the State labeled it an indirect franchise tax
as opposed to a direct gross receipts tax—in form, a permissible indirect
interference with interstate commerce.
Justice Stone took a more pragmatic approach. He first rejected
Western Live Stock’s claim that the Commerce Clause insulated the out27
See N.J. Bell Tel. Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes & Assessments of N.J., 280 U.S. 338, 339 (1930)
(“It is therefore a direct tax on gross receipts derived from interstate commerce, and to that extent, an
invalid regulation of or burden upon such commerce.”).
28
See In re State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. 232, 278–79 (1872) (“[The tax upon freight] must therefore
be considered an exaction, in right of alleged sovereignty, from freight transported, or the right of
transportation out of, or into, or through the State—a burden upon interstate intercourse.”).
29
Maine v. Grand Truck Ry., 142 U.S. 217, 228–29 (1891).
30
See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (announcing what has
come to be known as the Complete Auto test).
31
Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 43 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting).
32
See id. at 44 (“[T]he traditional test of the limit of state action [that] inquir[es] whether the
interference with commerce is direct or indirect seems to me too mechanical, too uncertain in its
application, and too remote from actualities, to be of value.”).
33
Id.
34
POMP, supra note 6, at 1-12.
35
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 253 (1938).
36
Id. at 251–52.
37
Id. at 252; see POMP, supra note 6, at 1-12 (“All the work in preparing the magazine took place
in New Mexico.”).
38
Western Live Stock, 303 U.S. at 252.
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of-state advertising receipts from taxation simply because they arose from
an interstate contract.39 Invoking concepts similar to today’s state tax terms
of art “nexus” and “unitary business,” he held that New Mexico could tax
the receipts from out-of-state advertisers because Western Live Stock
prepared, printed, and published the magazine advertisements in that
State.40
Even more presciently, Justice Stone identified the concept of
apportionment as a mechanism for deciding whether New Mexico’s
taxation of the out-of-state advertisement receipts was impermissible
because the interstate distribution of the magazine enhanced the value of
those advertisements.41 The Court responded to this question in the
negative, holding that the purported burden on interstate commerce was
“too remote and too attenuated.”42 Justice Stone found it decisive that no
other state could duplicate the New Mexico tax; there was no potential risk
of “multiple taxation.”43 The Court concluded that the Commerce Clause
does not shield businesses engaged in interstate commerce from their fair
share of a state’s tax burden44—a rejection of prior precedent,45 and a
vitalization of the principle of fairly apportioned state taxation.
After Western Live Stock, the multiple taxation analysis seemingly
became the rule.46 In J.D. Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, the Court
held that an unapportioned gross receipts tax created a substantial risk of “a
double tax burden,” and therefore violated the Commerce Clause.47 The
Court concluded that other states could tax the receipts from interstate
activities that Indiana taxed—for example, states where the goods were
sold and manufactured—and thus held that the tax favored intrastate over
interstate commerce.48
39

Id. at 253.
Id. at 258.
41
Id. at 254–55. The implication being that some other state (or states) should be allowed to tax
the receipts because their value could be attributed to states other than New Mexico.
42
Id. at 259.
43
Id. at 260; see POMP, supra note 6, at 1-13 (“Justice Stone articulated a cumulative burdens or
multiple taxation analysis . . . .”).
44
Western Live Stock, 303 U.S. at 254.
45
See Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888) (holding that state taxation of interstate
commerce in any form violates the Commerce Clause).
46
See POMP, supra note 6, at 1-17 (explaining that the Court “seemed to have abandoned . . . the
old ‘direct-indirect’ test . . . in Western Live Stock.”).
47
See J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938) (emphasis added) (“The vice of
the statute as applied to receipts from interstate sales is that the tax includes in its measure, without
apportionment, receipts derived from activities in interstate commerce; and that the exaction is of such
character that if lawful it may in substance be laid to the fullest extent by states in which the goods are
sold as well as those in which they are manufactured. Interstate commerce would thus be subjected to
the risk of a double tax burden to which intrastate commerce is not exposed, and which the commerce
clause forbids.”).
48
Id.
40
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Before finally settling Justice Stone’s pragmatic multiple taxation
approach in its jurisprudence, the Court briefly retreated to formalism.49
Justice Felix Frankfurter, a diehard dormant Commerce Clause
proponent,50 took his last stand in Freeman v. Hewit51 and Spector Motor
Service, Inc. v. O’Connor.52
With Justice Frankfurter writing the majority opinion, the Court in
Freeman held that an Indiana gross receipts tax imposed directly upon
interstate sales was unconstitutional merely due to its form.53 Similarly, in
Spector, the Court held that a Connecticut tax on the privilege of doing
business—as applied to businesses solely involved in interstate
commerce—was unconstitutional.54 The Court asserted that its holding in
Spector did not conflict with prior decisions permitting states to tax the
privilege of doing business where a taxpayer’s business was both intrastate
and interstate.55 According to the Court, the Connecticut tax at issue was
not facially invalid, but invalid as applied to solely interstate businesses.56
The multiple taxation analysis that the Court articulated in Western
Live Stock returned shortly after Spector.57 In Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, the Court held that, absent discrimination or
unfair apportionment, a state may tax an out-of-state corporation’s net
income from its interstate operations.58 The Court did not dispose of
Spector, but instead opted to distinguish it on technical grounds.59
49
See POMP, supra note 6, at 1-16 (explaining that “the Court under the leadership of Justice
Frankfurter started to back slide” toward formalism).
50
See id. at 1-17 (“Justice Frankfurter [was] interest[ed] in a free trade zone . . . [protected] ‘from
interference by the States.’”).
51
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
52
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
53
See Freeman, 329 U.S. at 256 (“[A] seller State has various means of obtaining legitimate
contribution to the costs of its government, without imposing a direct tax on interstate sales. While
these permitted taxes may, in an ultimate sense, come out of interstate commerce, they are not, as
would be a tax on gross receipts, a direct imposition on that very freedom of commercial flow which
for more than a hundred and fifty years has been the ward of the Commerce Clause.”).
54
Spector, 340 U.S. at 603.
55
Id. at 609–10.
56
See id. (footnote omitted) (“Our conclusion is not in conflict with the principle that, where a
taxpayer is engaged both in intrastate and interstate commerce, a state may tax the privilege of carrying
on intrastate business and, within reasonable limits, may compute the amount of the charge by applying
the tax rate to a fair proportion of the taxpayer’s business done within the state, including both
interstate and intrastate.”).
57
See POMP, supra note 6, at 1-19 (“Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota
abandoned Justice Frankfurter’s views and . . . [the Court] return[ed] to its prior emphasis on multiple
taxation . . . .”).
58
Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minn., 358 U.S. 450, 461–63 (1959).
59
See id. at 463–64 (quoting Spector, 340 U.S. at 603) (“[T]he tax [in Spector] was ‘imposed
upon the franchise of a foreign corporation for the privilege of doing business within the State . . . .’ . . .
It was not a levy on net income but an excise or tax placed on the franchise of a foreign corporation
engaged ‘exclusively’ in interstate operations.”).
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Eventually, the Court remedied this judicial fecklessness in Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady when it explicitly overruled Spector.60
C. The Death of Formalism: The Complete Auto Test
The death of formalism and the advent of a new test for subjecting
state taxation to dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny arose in Complete
Auto. The Court eliminated the Spector rule from its jurisprudence,
proclaiming that it “has no relationship to economic realities” and acts
simply “as a trap for the unwary draftsman.”61 The Court insightfully
recognized that draftsmanship was the only distinguishing factor in
Northwestern States and Spector, even though the cases had distinct
outcomes.62
In Complete Auto, the Court methodically examined two cases that
exemplified the flawed nature of the Spector rule—Railway Express I63 and
Railway Express II.64 In Railway Express I, the Court held that Virginia’s
annual license tax on gross receipts for the privilege of doing business
violated the Commerce Clause.65 The Court determined that the tax was
unconstitutional because it was a direct tax on the privilege of doing
business as opposed to an indirect property tax.66 To remedy this
constitutional infirmity, Virginia redrafted its tax statute, labeling it a
franchise tax on intangible property in the form of going concern value
measured by gross receipts.67 In Railway Express II, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the reworded statute.68 Recognizing the
preposterousness of the Railway Express cases and unwilling to continue to
“attach[] constitutional significance to . . . semantic difference[s]” any
longer,69 the Court in Complete Auto essentially rationalized the analysis.
The Court has since interpreted Complete Auto as creating a fourpronged test for subjecting state taxation of interstate commerce to
60

Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288–89 (1977).
Id. at 279.
62
See id. at 285 (“Thus, applying the rule of Northwestern Cement to the facts of Spector, it is
clear that Connecticut could have taxed the apportioned net income derived from the exclusively
interstate commerce. It could not, however, tax the ‘privilege’ of doing business as measured by the
apportioned net income. The reason for attaching constitutional significance to a semantic difference is
difficult to discern.”).
63
Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954) [hereinafter Railway Express I].
64
Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959) [hereinafter Railway Express II].
65
Railway Express I, 347 U.S. at 369.
66
See id. (“We think we can only regard this tax as being in fact and effect just what the
Legislature said it was—a privilege tax, and one that cannot be applied to an exclusively interstate
business.”).
67
Railway Express II, 358 U.S. at 438.
68
Id. at 441–42.
69
See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 285 (1977) (“The reason for attaching
constitutional significance to a semantic difference is difficult to discern.”).
61
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constitutional scrutiny. Under the Complete Auto test, state taxation
survives the dormant Commerce Clause when it: (1) is applied to an
activity with substantial nexus to the taxing state; (2) is fairly apportioned;
(3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) is fairly
related to the services provided by the taxing state.70
1.

Nexus

Under the first prong of Complete Auto, a state can only tax activities
that have a substantial nexus to it.71 Prior to Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,
Due Process Clause nexus and Commerce Clause nexus were identical.72
The Court had never before examined nexus separately under the two
different clauses.73
In Quill, the Court held that North Dakota could not compel a
corporation without physical presence in the State to collect its use tax on
sales made to North Dakota customers.74 In so ruling, the Court held that
the Commerce Clause, but not the Due Process Clause, requires physical
presence nexus for a state to require a vendor to collect its use tax.75 After
Quill, Due Process Clause nexus became substantively identical to the
“minimum contacts” nexus required for subjecting an individual to a state
court’s personal jurisdiction,76 whereas the Commerce Clause set a higher
bar.
Nonetheless, even after Quill, the Commerce Clause demanded a lower
standard of nexus for the imposition of an income tax than for the
collection of a use tax. Whereas the Commerce Clause commanded a
considerably higher standard than the Due Process Clause for the
collection of a use tax, it required only a slightly higher standard (economic
nexus) for the imposition of an income tax.77 While never decided by the
70

Id. at 279.
Id.
72
See Richard D. Pomp, Revisiting Miller Brothers, Bellas Hess, and Quill, 65 AM. U. L. REV.
1115, 1144 (2016) (explaining that prior precedent did not support the bifurcation of Due Process
Clause and Commerce Clause nexus in Quill).
73
See id. at 1145 (“As two leading scholars noted, the Court’s failure to cite any other cases was
not an oversight: ‘the Court’s discovery that ‘[d]espite the similarity in phrasing, the nexus
requirements of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses are not identical’ is more accurately viewed as
a doctrinal epiphany than as a logical inference to be drawn from the careful reading of its
precedents.’”).
74
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311–12 (1992).
75
Id.
76
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
77
See KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308, 325–26 (Iowa 2010), cert. denied,
565 U.S. 817 (Oct. 3, 2011) (“We also doubt that the [United States] Supreme Court would extend the
‘physical presence’ rule outside the sales and use tax context of Quill.”); Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax
Comm’n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 18 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (Nov. 29, 1993) (“We hold that by
licensing intangibles for use in this State and deriving income from their use here, Geoffrey has a
‘substantial nexus’ [under the Commerce Clause] with South Carolina.”).
71
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United States Supreme Court, the majority of state supreme courts have
held that economic nexus grants a state Commerce Clause permission to
levy an income tax.78 In this respect, the now defunct physical presence
requirement of Quill never applied to income taxes.79
Twenty-six years later, the Supreme Court overruled Quill’s
Commerce Clause holding in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.80 In Wayfair,
the Court abrogated the physical presence rule and held that certain remote
vendors’ significant “economic and virtual contacts” with South Dakota
satisfied Complete Auto’s substantial nexus requirement.81 In so ruling, the
Court set a much lower nexus standard—economic nexus—for the
collection of a use tax.82 It would appear that economic nexus now permits
a state to both levy an income tax and compel remote vendors to collect its
use tax under Complete Auto’s first prong.
2.

Fair Apportionment

Under the second prong of Complete Auto, state taxation of interstate
commerce must be fairly apportioned.83 The Court has further articulated
two subprongs of the fair apportionment prong—internal consistency and
external consistency.84
A state tax is internally consistent if a taxpayer engaged in interstate
commerce would not bear a greater total tax burden than a taxpayer
engaged in intrastate commerce in a hypothetical world where every state
78

POMP, supra note 6, at 11-213 to -214.
Id.
80
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).
81
Id.
82
See id. (internal citations omitted) (“In the absence of Quill and Bellas Hess, the first prong of
Complete Auto asks whether the tax applies to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state .
. . . Here, the nexus is clearly sufficient based on both the economic and virtual contacts respondents
have with the State. The Act only applies to sellers that deliver more than $100,000 of goods or
services into South Dakota or engage in 200 or more separate transactions for the delivery of goods and
services into the State on an annual basis. This quantity of business could not have occurred unless the
seller availed itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business in South Dakota. And
respondents are large, national companies that undoubtedly maintain an extensive virtual presence.
Thus, the substantial nexus requirement of Complete Auto is satisfied in this case.”).
83
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
84
See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995) (“For over a decade
now, we have assessed any threat of malapportionment by asking whether the tax is ‘internally
consistent’ and, if so, whether it is ‘externally consistent’ as well.”). The internal consistency subprong
first appeared in the Court’s jurisprudence in Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S.
159, 169 (1983) (emphasis added) (“The first, and again obvious, component of fairness in an
apportionment formula is what might be called internal consistency—that is the formula must be such
that, if applied by every jurisdiction, it would result in no more than all of the unitary business’s
income being taxed.”). For an in-depth discussion of the merits of the internal consistency test and the
Court’s application of this subprong in pre-Wynne case law, see Walter Hellerstein, Is “Internal
Consistency” Foolish?: Reflections on an Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87
MICH. L. REV. 138 (1988) and Walter Hellerstein, Is “Internal Consistency” Dead?: Reflections on an
Evolving Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 61 TAX L. REV. 1 (2007).
79
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85

levied an identical tax. An internally inconsistent tax fails the fair
apportionment prong prima facie, and is therefore unconstitutional.86 If a
tax is internally consistent, inquiry into external consistency follows.
A tax is externally consistent if it does not “reach[] beyond that portion
of value that is fairly attributable to economic activity within the taxing
State.”87 There is no innate or inherent aspect of the external consistency
inquiry, but actual multiple taxation may indicate external inconsistency.88
One leading scholar believes that the Wynne holding may render external
consistency obsolete.89
3.

Non-Discriminatory

Under the third prong of Complete Auto, state taxation cannot
discriminate against interstate commerce.90 A state satisfies the nondiscrimination prong if it taxes interstate commerce at the same rate as
intrastate commerce, so that a taxpayer engaged in interstate commerce
does not bear a greater total tax burden than one engaged in purely
intrastate commerce.91
Internally inconsistent taxes are a priori discriminatory.92 Importantly,
an internally consistent tax is not necessarily non-discriminatory—a
proposition the Court did not address in Wynne. The second prong of
Complete Auto conflates with the third prong when a tax is internally
inconsistent, but not necessarily when a tax is internally consistent.
For example, in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, the Court held
85

Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185.
Id. (emphasis added) (“A failure of internal consistency shows as a matter of law that a State is
attempting to take more than its fair share of taxes from the interstate transaction, since allowing such a
tax in one State would place interstate commerce at the mercy of those remaining States that might
impose an identical tax.”).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Edward A. Zelinsky, The Enigma of Wynne, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 797, 808–10 (2016).
90
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
91
See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1805 (2015) (“The critical
point is that the total tax burden on interstate commerce is higher, not that Maryland may receive more
or less tax revenue from a particular taxpayer.”); Jesse H. Choper & Tung Yin, State Taxation and the
Dormant Commerce Clause: The Object-Measure Approach, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 214 (1998)
(“Under current doctrine, [the third prong] appears to be satisfied if the tax is applied at the same rate to
intrastate and interstate business.”).
92
See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1805 (holding that Maryland’s internally inconsistent personal income
tax regime was discriminatory and therefore violated the dormant Commerce Clause); Armco, Inc. v.
Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984) (“In [Container], the Court [announced the internal consistency
test]. In that case, the Court was discussing the requirement that a tax be fairly apportioned . . . A
similar rule applies where the allegation is that a tax on its face discriminates against interstate
commerce. A tax that unfairly apportions income from other States is a form of discrimination against
interstate commerce.”). But see Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429,
438 (upholding an internally inconsistent Michigan flat fee on trucks engaged in commercial hauling
because the State imposed the tax on purely local activity).
86
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that New York’s corporate franchise tax credit measured by the amount of
exports shipped from an in-state location discriminated against interstate
export shipping and therefore offended the dormant Commerce Clause.93
Even though this provision was internally consistent—if every state
adopted an identical credit, a New York corporation shipping exports from,
say, Connecticut would not bear a greater total franchise tax burden than a
New York corporation shipping exports from New York—the Court
nonetheless held it to be discriminatory. Other examples of internally
consistent state tax provisions that courts have nevertheless struck down as
discriminatory include accelerated depreciation deductions limited to instate property94 and a corporate franchise tax credit for in-state
investment.95

93

Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 407 (1984).
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. City of N.Y. Dep’t of Fin., 667 N.Y.S. 2d 4, 9, 11 (App. Div.
1997); Beatrice Cheese, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, Docket Nos. 91-I-100, 91-I-101, 91-I-102, 1993
WL 57202, at *3 (Wis. Tax App. Comm’n Feb. 24, 1993).
95
Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 746 (6th Cir. 2004).
94
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4. Fair Relation to Services Provided by the Taxing State
The fourth prong of Complete Auto requires state taxation to be fairly
related to the services provided by the taxing state.96 The Court effectively
eviscerated this prong in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana.97
Under current doctrine, the fair relation analysis is a rather spineless
inquiry. State taxation will never fail this prong, as it requires no detailed
measurements or calculations to prove the requisite fair relation.98
Additionally, courts consider benefits wholly unrelated to the taxable event
in the fair relation analysis.99 Police protection, fire protection, and a state’s
“maintenance of a civilized society”—all three of which facilitate business
transactions—will always satisfy the fair relation prong.100 In a sense, the
fourth prong conflates with the first—taxes that satisfy the nexus
requirement will surely satisfy the fair relation requirement.101
III.

CRITICISM OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE

Originalist justices virulently oppose the dormant Commerce Clause,
seeing it as unsupported by the text of the Constitution and a quintessential
example of “judicially created” law.102 Opponents of the dormant
Commerce Clause include the late Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and
(probably)103 recently confirmed Justice Gorsuch.104 Both the late Justice
96

Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 627–28 (1981) (citations omitted)
(“The simple fact is that the appropriate level or rate of taxation is essentially a matter for legislative,
and not judicial, resolution. In essence, appellants ask this Court to prescribe a test for the validity of
state taxes that would require state and federal courts, as a matter of federal constitutional law, to
calculate acceptable rates or levels of taxation of activities that are conceded to be legitimate subjects of
taxation. This we decline to do.”).
98
See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 199 (1995) (“The [fourth prong]
requires no detailed accounting of the services provided to the taxpayer on account of the activity being
taxed, nor, indeed, is a State limited to offsetting the public costs created by the taxed activity.”).
99
Id. at 199–200.
100
Id. at 200.
101
See Choper & Yin, supra note 91, at 215 (opining that the fourth factor of the Complete Auto
test appears redundant in light of the first factor’s nexus requirement).
102
See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1808 (2015) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (condemning the dormant Commerce Clause as a “judicial fraud” and a “brazen
invention”); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring to the dormant Commerce Clause as “judicially created” law).
103
See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100–01 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(“My agreement with the Court’s discussion of the history of our dormant [C]ommerce [C]lause
jurisprudence, however, should not be mistaken for agreement with all aspects of the doctrine. The
Commerce Clause is found in Article I and authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
Meanwhile, our dormant commerce cases suggest Article III courts may invalidate state laws that
offend no congressional statute. Whether and how much of this can be squared with the text of the
Commerce Clause, justified by stare decisis, or defended as misbranded products of federalism or
antidiscrimination imperatives flowing from Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause are
questions for another day.”); Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1148 (10th Cir. 2016)
97
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Scalia and Justice Thomas have flamboyantly eviscerated the doctrine in
dissents and concurrences.105 Their criticisms are similar, but not identical.
Justice Scalia deeply respected stare decisis, whereas Justice Thomas
gives it little to no weight.106 Also, unlike Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia
was willing to use the dormant Commerce Clause to strike down facially
discriminatory state laws.107 A deeper analysis of the late Justice Scalia’s,
Justice Thomas’, and Justice Gorsuch’s views with respect to the dormant
Commerce Clause follows.

(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (“[T]he Commerce Clause is found in Article I of the
Constitution and it grants Congress the authority to adopt laws regulating interstate commerce.
Meanwhile, in dormant commerce clause cases Article III courts have claimed the (anything but
dormant) power to strike down some state laws even in the absence of congressional direction.”).
Professor Edward A. Zelinsky describes Justice Gorsuch as “leery of the dormant Commerce Clause”
and believes that he “[]probably[]” views it as a “misbegotten project.” Edward A. Zelinsky,
Comparing Wayfair to Wynne: Lessons for the Future of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 22 CHAP. L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2018–2019)
(manuscript
at
5,
20)
(available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3249785).
104
Previous justices have also expressed criticism of the doctrine, albeit with less forcefulness or
“scholarly weaponry.” See POMP, supra note 6, at 1-4 n.17 (explaining that “Justice [Hugo] Black
expressed similar views to Justice Scalia,” minus the intellectual ammunition); id. at 1-6 n.26
(describing “Chief Justice [Roger] Taney’s rejection of the dormant Commerce Clause” and “similar
views expressed . . . by Justice[] [William] Douglas and [Justice] Black.”). Like Justice Thomas (but
unlike Justice Scalia), Chief Justice Taney “would have upheld a tax that discriminated against
interstate commerce.” Id.
At the end of the Supreme Court’s 2018 term, Justice Anthony Kennedy retired and President
Donald Trump nominated then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to replace
him. Mark Landler & Maggie Haberman, Brett Kavanaugh is Trump’s Pick for Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-supremecourt.html. After a contentious and highly partisan confirmation battle, the Senate, by a narrow 50 to 48
vote, confirmed then-Judge Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court. Clare Foran & Stephen Collinson, Brett
Kavanaugh
confirmed
to
Supreme
Court,
CNN,
Oct.
6,
2018,
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/06/politics/kavanaugh-final-confirmation-vote/index.html. If Justice
Kavanaugh shares the skepticism of the late Justice Scalia and Justices Thomas and Gorsuch with
respect to the dormant Commerce Clause (which is no guarantee), the Court’s state tax jurisprudence
could change significantly. For example, three dormant Commerce Clause skeptics could join with just
two of the Court’s liberals to uphold state taxes similar to Maryland’s in Wynne.
105
See infra Part III.A (discussing Justice Scalia’s criticism of the dormant Commerce Clause);
infra Part III.B (discussing Justice Thomas’ criticism of the dormant Commerce Clause).
106
Adam Liptak, Thomas Is Getting a New Chance to Break Precedent (if not Silence), N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2014, at A15.
107
E.g., Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 271 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Justice Thomas, on
the other hand, believes that the Constitution expressly proscribes the states from levying taxes that
facially discriminate against interstate commerce under a different clause, the Import-Export Clause.
See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted) (“[T]he Constitution [seems] to provide an express check on the States’
power to levy certain discriminatory taxes on the commerce of other states—not in the judicially
created negative Commerce Clause, but in the Art. I, § 10, Import-Export Clause, our decision in
Woodruff v. Parham notwithstanding.”).
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A. The Late Justice Scalia
The late Justice Scalia abhorred the dormant Commerce Clause, but
was willing to both (1) use the doctrine to strike down facially
discriminatory state laws,108 and (2) refuse to overturn dormant Commerce
Clause holdings in the spirit of stare decisis—especially because Congress
could intervene via legislation to overturn such decisions.109
Notwithstanding his concurrence in Quill,110 Justice Scalia consistently
articulated his displeasure with the dormant Commerce Clause in state tax
cases.
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., Justice Scalia
concurred in the Court’s opinion that an Oklahoma sales tax on the full
price of a bus ticket purchased for interstate travel was consistent with the
Commerce Clause.111 Unlike the Court, however, Justice Scalia did not
analyze the tax under the Complete Auto test.112 He believed the tax was
constitutional solely because it did not facially discriminate against
interstate commerce.113 Justice Scalia used the opportunity to mock both
the dormant Commerce Clause114 and the Complete Auto test—the latter of
which he called “eminently unhelpful.”115 He ultimately implied that the
dormant Commerce Clause is a counterfeit, illegitimate subversion of
congressional authority.116
Likewise, in Wynne, Justice Scalia dissented to excoriate the dormant
Commerce Clause.117 He called the doctrine a “judicial fraud” and a
108
Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 271 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also POMP, supra note 6, at 1-6 n.26
(“Justice Scalia would not . . . have upheld a tax that discriminated against interstate commerce.”).
109
See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 320 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation
omitted) (“I would not revisit the merits of [the Commerce Clause holding of Bellas Hess], but would
adhere to it on the basis of stare decisis. Congress has the final say over regulation of interstate
commerce, and it can change the rule of Bellas Hess by simply saying so. We have long recognized that
the doctrine of stare decisis has ‘special force’ where ‘Congress remains free to alter what we have
done.’”). The idea that the command of stare decisis is even stronger when Congress is free to act is a
curious argument to hear from an originalist. For further discussion of the Court’s now defunct physical
presence nexus standard for state sales and use tax collection (which is beyond the scope of this Note),
see Pomp, Revisiting Miller Brothers, Bellas Hess, and Quill, supra note 72.
110
Quill, 504 U.S. at 319 (Scalia, J., concurring).
111
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200–01 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
See id. at 200 (“That seems to me the most we can demand to certify compliance with the
‘negative Commerce Clause’—which is ‘negative’ not only because it negates state regulation of
commerce, but also because it does not appear in the Constitution.”).
115
Id. at 201.
116
See id. (“Under the real Commerce Clause . . . it is for Congress to make the judgment that
interstate commerce must be immunized from certain sorts of nondiscriminatory state action . . . .”).
117
See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1808 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“The principal purpose of my writing separately is to point out how wrong our negative
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118

“brazen invention.” In paradigmatic Scalia fashion, he chastised the
majority for its (albeit correct)119 statement that the doctrine has “deep
roots” in the Court’s jurisprudence.120 He further lambasted the Complete
Auto test—particularly the concept of internal consistency—for its “ad
hocery.”121
These opinions shed some light on the late Justice Scalia’s position on
Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause. Justice Scalia believed
that, when Congress does not legislate on a particular subject, the states are
permitted to regulate interstate commerce via facially neutral statutes.122
Instead of courts analyzing such laws under the dormant Commerce
Clause, Justice Scalia would have preferred Congress to be the final
arbiter. In his view, if Congress believes that a state regulation
impermissibly burdens interstate commerce, it can simply preempt the state
law at issue.123 Under this interpretation of the Commerce Clause, courts
should not apply the Complete Auto test because such determinations are
legislative tasks for Congress to undertake.
B. Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas rejects the dormant Commerce Clause perhaps to an
even greater degree than the late Justice Scalia.124 He is also much more
skeptical of stare decisis than his former colleague.125
Justice Thomas has openly expressed self-deprecatory regret for
writing and joining dormant Commerce Clause opinions early in his tenure

commerce clause jurisprudence is in the first place, and how well today’s decision illustrates its
error.”).
118
Id. at 1808.
119
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 13 (1824) (explaining that the states have no general
concurrent commerce powers and that Congress’ commerce authority reigns supreme over that of the
states’ in certain circumstances).
120
See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1808 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (“The Court claims that
the [dormant Commerce Clause] ‘has deep roots.’ So it does, like many weeds.”).
121
Id. at 1809.
122
See id. at 1808 (“The [Commerce] Clause says nothing about prohibiting state laws that burden
commerce. Much less does it say anything about authorizing judges to set aside state laws they believe
burden commerce.”).
123
See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 201 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“Under the real Commerce Clause . . . it is for Congress to make the judgment that
interstate commerce must be immunized from certain sorts of nondiscriminatory state action—a
judgment that may embrace (as ours ought not) such imponderables as how much ‘value [is] fairly
attributable to economic activity within the taxing State,’ and what constitutes ‘fair relation between a
tax and the benefits conferred upon the taxpayer by the State.’”).
124
See, e.g., POMP, supra note 6, at 1-6 n.26 (“Justice Scalia would not . . . have upheld a tax that
discriminated against interstate commerce . . . [,] but Justice Thomas apparently would.”).
125
Justice Scalia himself even stated that Justice Thomas “does not believe in stare decisis,
period.” Liptak, supra note 106, at A15.
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126

on the Court.
In Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
127
he took his “leave of the ‘dormant’ Commerce Clause”
Harrison,
because, in his words, “it ceased to make sense to [him].”128 In his Wayfair
concurrence, Justice Thomas acknowledged that he should have joined
Justice Byron White’s dissent in Quill. That is, “adher[ing] to [dormant
Commerce Clause] jurisprudence in [that case]” by joining Justice Scalia’s
concurrence was something he would never do today.129 Now, he rejects
“the Court’s entire negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”130
While typically employing a less vicious and sarcastic tone than the
late Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas has similarly expressed disdain toward
the dormant Commerce Clause in his opinions. He has referred to dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence as “overbroad,” “unnecessary,” and
“unmoored from any constitutional text.”131 Additionally, he has argued
that the doctrine “has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little
sense, and [is] virtually unworkable.”132
Justice Thomas diverges from the late Justice Scalia in his view that
even facially discriminatory state tax laws do not offend the Commerce
Clause. According to Justice Thomas, the Court’s interpretation that the
Commerce Clause has an implicit negative command is inconsistent with
the original meaning of the Constitution and thus the Court should never
apply the doctrine.133 He believes instead that another constitutional
provision, the Import-Export Clause, explicitly proscribes facially
discriminatory state taxation of interstate commerce.134 Justice Thomas
views the original meaning of that clause as prohibiting states from levying
tariffs not only on goods imported from, or exported to, foreign nations,
126
See Clarence Thomas Transcript, Conversations with Bill Kristol, https://perma.cc/G9VNA7FU (last visited Dec. 14, 2018) (“[W]hen I got to the Court, I wrote some ‘dormant’ Commerce
Clause opinions; I went along with them because I [had not] thought it through.”).
127
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
128
Clarence Thomas Transcript, supra note 126.
129
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Presumably, Justice Thomas will never again write an opinion striking down a state law under the
dormant Commerce Clause as he did in Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envt’l Quality of State of Or.,
511 U.S. 93 (1994).
130
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2100.
131
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 610 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
132
Id.
133
See, e.g., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 237 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Though
the Court has properly applied our dormant Commerce Clause precedents, I continue to adhere to my
view that ‘[t]he negative commerce clause has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little
sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in application, and, consequently, cannot serve as a basis
for striking down a state statute.’”).
134
See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 610 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted) (“[T]he Constitution [seems] to provide an express check on the States’ power to levy certain
discriminatory taxes on the commerce of other States—not in the judicially created negative Commerce
Clause, but in the Art. I, § 10, Import-Export Clause, our decision in Woodruff v. Parham,
notwithstanding.”).
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but also other states. He opines that, to the Framers of the Constitution,
the terms “import” and “export” referred to trade amongst the states as well
as with foreign nations.136
C. Justice Gorsuch
Prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court in 2017, Justice
Gorsuch served as a judge on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. As a
circuit court judge, he was bound to follow Supreme Court precedent,
making it impermissible for him to disregard the dormant Commerce
Clause.
Nonetheless, in Energy and Environment Legal Institute v. Epel,137
then-Judge Gorsuch mentioned the common criticisms of the doctrine.138
Arguably,139 the context of his Epel opinion shows that then-Judge
Gorsuch positively acknowledged these criticisms by not dismissing them
outright for being outside mainstream legal thought (as Justice Alito did in
Wynne).140 Additionally, in Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl (at the
Tenth Circuit), then-Judge Gorsuch took an interesting jab at the doctrine,
referring to it as “anything but dormant” because courts often employ it to
strike down state legislation even absent congressional preemption.141
While Justice Gorsuch certainly aligns with many conservative legal
theories,142 opposition to the dormant Commerce Clause is one that divides
the Court’s conservative bloc. In Wayfair, his first dormant Commerce
Clause case as a Supreme Court Justice, Justice Gorsuch could have
clarified his views with respect to the doctrine.143 Instead, he simply
reiterated his previously expressed qualms144 and decided that the overall
135

Id. at 621.
Id.
137
Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2015).
138
See id. at 1171 (citations omitted) (“Detractors find dormant commerce clause doctrine absent
from the Constitution’s text and incompatible with its structure. But as an inferior court we take
Supreme Court precedent as we find it and dormant commerce clause jurisprudence remains very much
alive today . . . .”).
139
This Author believes that the context of the Epel opinion shows that then-Judge Gorsuch is
implicitly criticizing the dormant Commerce Clause by explicitly mentioning the common criticisms of
the doctrine.
140
Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1809 (2015).
141
Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1148 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
142
See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Justice Gorsuch’s First Opinions Reveal a Confident Textualist,
WASH. POST, June 23, 2017 (“Associate Justice Neil Gorsuch has written three opinions . . . . All three
show the Supreme Court’s newest justice to be a confident, committed textualist with a distinctive
writing style . . . .”). Justice Gorsuch also harbors deep skepticism of the Chevron doctrine, which even
the late Justice Scalia favored. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring). Like the dormant Commerce Clause, Chevron is a judicially created doctrine.
143
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100–01 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
144
See id. (“My agreement with the Court’s discussion of the history of our dormant [C]ommerce
[C]lause jurisprudence, however, should not be mistaken for agreement with all aspects of the doctrine.
136
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COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY OF MARYLAND V. WYNNE

A. Background
Brian and Karen Wynne, a wealthy Maryland couple, conducted
business via a pass-through entity, and filed income tax returns in thirtynine states.146 As residents of Maryland, that State taxed the Wynnes on
their worldwide income. Additionally, the other states in which the
Wynnes conducted business taxed them on income sourced in those states.
The Maryland personal income tax scheme that the Wynnes
challenged, in the words of Justice Alito, was rather “unusual.”147
Maryland imposed both a progressive “State” income tax and a flat
“county” income tax that varied in rate.148 Maryland also taxed
nonresidents on their Maryland sourced income.149 The State required
nonresidents subject to the State income tax, but not the county income tax,
to pay a “special nonresident” tax.150 Maryland applied this tax at the
lowest county income tax rate.151
Maryland allowed taxpayers a credit for income taxes paid to other
states against the State income tax, but not the county income tax.152 The
Wynnes challenged this aspect of the statute as unconstitutional as applied
in their specific case.153
Because they paid so much in income taxes to other states, the Wynnes
had an excess credit that they argued should have reduced (or eliminated)
their Maryland county income tax. For example, assume the Wynnes paid
$100,000 in income taxes to other states and owed Maryland $100,000 in
income taxes—$68,000 on the State portion and $32,000 on the county
portion. They would use $68,000 of their $100,000 credit for income taxes
The Commerce Clause is found in Article I and authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
Meanwhile, our dormant commerce cases suggest Article III courts may invalidate state laws that
offend no congressional statute. Whether and how much of this can be squared with the text of the
Commerce Clause, justified by stare decisis, or defended as misbranded products of federalism or
antidiscrimination imperatives flowing from Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause are
questions for another day.”).
145
Id. at 2101.
146
Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1793 (2015).
147
Id. at 1792.
148
Id. The county income tax rates ranged from 1.25% to 3.2%. Walter Hellerstein, Deciphering
the Supreme Court’s Opinion in Wynne, 2015 J. TAX’N 4, 5 (2015).
149
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792.
150
Id.
151
Id. Therefore, the special nonresident tax rate was 1.25%. Hellerstein, Deciphering the
Supreme Court’s Opinion in Wynne, supra note 149.
152
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792.
153
Id. at 1793.
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paid to other states to eliminate the State portion of the Maryland income
tax. Maryland, however, would not allow the Wynnes to use their excess
credit of $32,000 to eliminate the county portion of its income tax.
The Maryland Tax Court held for the State, but the Circuit Court for
Howard County reversed and held that the Maryland income tax scheme
violated the dormant Commerce Clause.154 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland, the State’s highest court, affirmed the trial court’s holding after
analyzing the tax under Complete Auto.155 The State’s highest court held
that the tax was both internally inconsistent and discriminatory.156 In so
ruling, Maryland’s highest court originally held that the tax was
discriminatory because of Maryland’s refusal to permit a credit for income
taxes paid to other states against the county income tax, but later clarified
that the State could use another “method of apportionment” to remedy this
constitutional defect.157
B. The Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court, with Justice Alito writing for a 5-4
majority (a closer decision than many expected),158 held that the Maryland
income tax scheme “[had] the same economic effect as a state tariff,”
which is the “quintessential evil targeted by the dormant Commerce
Clause.”159 Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of Maryland’s
highest court and held that the State’s income tax scheme was
unconstitutional.160
The Court analyzed the Maryland income tax scheme doctrinally under
Complete Auto.161 The Court’s analysis specifically focused on the internal
consistency test,162 with Justice Alito cogently articulating the internal
154

Id.
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
See Donald Williamson & Michelle M. Hobbs, The Constitution’s Dormant Commerce Clause
Limits the Power of States to Tax Their Residents—Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Brian
Wynne et ux., AM. U. KOGOD SCH. OF BUS. RES. 1 (2015) (emphasis added) (“On May 18, the Supreme
Court in a surprisingly close 5-4 decision found that Maryland’s failure to grant a credit against its
county income tax for out-of-state income taxes paid by Maryland residents violates the Constitution’s
Commerce Clause.”). The four dissenters (Justices Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Kagan) were strange
bedfellows. This Author believes that these four justices voted together to uphold the Maryland income
tax scheme because Justices Scalia and Thomas abhor the dormant Commerce Clause, whereas Justices
Ginsburg and Kagan are political liberals who support expansive state taxing power. The dormant
Commerce Clause a priori restricts a state’s taxing power. It would appear that judicial originalists and
political liberals have reason to agree on this issue.
159
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 1803. The Court eschewed a traditional analysis of all four factors of Complete Auto,
simply analyzing the Maryland tax scheme under the internal consistency test.
162
See id. (“The Maryland income tax scheme fails the internal consistency test.”).
155
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inconsistency of the tax:
A simple example illustrates [that Maryland’s income tax
scheme is internally inconsistent]. Assume that every State
imposed the following taxes, which are similar to Maryland’s
“county” and “special nonresident” taxes: (1) a 1.25% tax on
income that residents earn in State, (2) a 1.25% tax on
income that residents earn in other jurisdictions, and (3) a
1.25% tax on income that nonresidents earn in State. Assume
further that two taxpayers, April and Bob, both live in State
A, but that April earns her income in State A whereas Bob
earns his income in State B. In this circumstance, Bob will
pay more income tax than April solely because he earns
income interstate. Specifically, April will have to pay a
1.25% tax only once, to State A. But Bob will have to pay a
1.25% tax twice: once to State A, where he resides, and once
to State B, where he earns the income.163
The Court also held that Maryland’s income tax scheme impermissibly
discriminated against interstate commerce by demonstrating how a person
earning income derived from interstate commerce would bear a greater
total income tax burden than one earning income purely intrastate.164 This
finding is rather unsurprising as an internally inconsistent tax is inherently
discriminatory.165
Additionally, the Court responded to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s
assertion that the internal consistency test “requires a State taxing based on
residence to ‘recede’ to a State taxing based on source.”166 For example,
Justice Ginsburg was concerned that the Court’s holding would compel
Maryland to “limit its residence-based taxation” if it also chose “to
exercise, to the full extent, its source-based authority [to tax].”167 To
establish internal consistency, Maryland would have to either: (1) grant a
credit for income taxes paid to other states against the county portion of its
income tax, (2) solely tax Maryland sourced income, or (3) eliminate the
special nonresident tax. All three options would prevent the State from
exercising unfettered authority to tax based on both residence and source.
Following the lead of Maryland’s highest court, the Court attempted to
rebuff (but did not directly address) Justice Ginsburg’s claim. Justice Alito
163

Id. at 1803–04.
See id. at 1805 (“The critical point is that the total tax burden on interstate commerce is higher,
not that Maryland may receive more or less tax revenue from a particular taxpayer.”).
165
See supra Section II.C.3.
166
See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1805 (citations omitted) (Justice Ginsburg’s “dissent claims that the
[internal consistency] analysis requires a State taxing based on residence to ‘recede’ to a State taxing
based on source. We establish no such rule of priority.”).
167
Id. at 1813–14 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
164
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simply refused to “foreclose the possibility” that a state could employ
methods other than offering a credit to remedy an internally inconsistent
tax.168 The Court declared, however, that allowing a credit against the
county income tax would make Maryland’s income tax scheme internally
consistent.169
While not rigorously examined in the opinion,170 the Court additionally
held that the Maryland county income tax was an extension of the State
taxing regime—a holding integral to the outcome of the case.171 This
important concept is relevant to this Note, as the New York City income
tax (like the Maryland county income tax) is merely a creature of the New
York State taxing regime.172
C. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent reads more like a policy paper than a
rigorous doctrinal legal opinion, and contains multiple misstatements of
law.173 Nonetheless, Justice Ginsburg indicated a fact that is important to
this Note: Maryland’s income tax scheme would achieve internal
consistency if the State were to repeal the special nonresident tax.174
In her first error, Justice Ginsburg conflated a state’s authority to tax
its own residents under the Due Process Clause with its obligations
168

Id. at 1806 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1805. Besides allowing a credit, the Court offers no other explicit method of making the
tax in question internally consistent. See id. at 1806 (citations omitted) (“But while Maryland could
cure the problem with its current system by granting a credit for taxes paid to other States, we do not
foreclose the possibility that it could comply with the Commerce Clause in some other way. Of course,
we do not decide the constitutionality of a hypothetical tax scheme that Maryland might adopt because
such a scheme is not before us.”). The most obvious way of making the tax internally consistent
without offering a credit would be to repeal the special nonresident tax (as Justice Ginsburg’s dissent
explains). Id. at 1822 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Maryland could also create internal consistency
without providing a credit if it only taxed Maryland sourced income. Nonetheless, the context of the
majority opinion implies that if a state adopts a credit, it must extend that credit against the county
portion of its income tax.
170
This issue is not rigorously examined in the opinion because the conclusion is clear. See id. at
1792 (majority opinion) (explaining that the county income tax is part of the State income tax despite
its label).
171
This explains Justice Alito’s placement of quotation marks around the word “county” and his
additional references to the tax as a so-called “county” tax throughout the opinion. See, e.g., id.
(internal citations omitted) (“The income tax that Maryland imposes upon its own residents has two
parts: a ‘state’ income tax, which is set at a graduated rate, and a so-called ‘county’ income tax, which
is set at a rate that varies by county but is capped at 3.2%. Despite the names that Maryland has
assigned to these taxes, both are State taxes, and both are collected by the State’s Comptroller of the
Treasury.”).
172
See infra Section V.A.
173
Described and examined in this Part, infra.
174
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1822 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This is precisely the structure of the New
York City income tax. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1302(a) (McKinney 2018) (providing that New York City
does not tax nonresidents).
169
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regarding such taxation under the Commerce Clause. Under the Due
Process Clause, a state indisputably may tax its residents on their
worldwide income.176 The Commerce Clause, however, requires that such
taxation be fairly apportioned and non-discriminatory, inter alia.177
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg referenced Justice Thurgood Marshall’s
erroneous dictum in Goldberg v. Sweet178—that “[i]t is not . . . a purpose of
the Commerce Clause to protect state residents from their own state
taxes.”179 Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg distinguished gross receipts taxes
from income taxes—a distinction the Court has long since discarded for
most purposes.180
The most relevant recognition in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent (at least for
the purposes of this Note) is that Maryland’s income tax scheme could
achieve internal consistency even without allowing the Wynnes a credit for
income taxes paid to other states against the county portion of the State
income tax.181 Instead, the State could simply repeal the special
nonresident tax.182 This appalled Justice Ginsburg,183 but the majority
dismissed it as an example of the multiple options available for a state to
remedy unconstitutional discrimination—a concept known as either
“level[ing] up” or “level[ing] down” in light of a constitutional infirmity.184
D. The Anti-Dormant Commerce Clause Dissents
As expected, both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas used Wynne as
another opportunity to condemn the dormant Commerce Clause. Justice
175
Id. at 1813 (internal citation omitted) (“Today’s decision veers from a principle of interstate
and international taxation repeatedly acknowledged by this Court: A nation or State ‘may tax all the
income of its residents, even income earned outside the taxing jurisdiction.’”).
176
See Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 57 (1920) (“As to residents [a state] may, and does, exert its
taxing power over their [worldwide] income . . . ”).
177
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
178
Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 266 (1989).
179
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1814 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Court abandoned this dictum in W.
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 203 (1994) (“State taxes are ordinarily paid by in-state
businesses and consumers, yet if they discriminate against out-of-state products, they are
unconstitutional.”).
180
See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1796 (citations omitted) (“The discarded distinction between taxes on
gross receipts and net income was based on the notion, endorsed in some early cases, that a tax on gross
receipts is an impermissible ‘direct and immediate burden’ on interstate commerce, whereas a tax on
net income is merely an ‘indirect and incidental’ burden.”).
181
See id. at 1822 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Because it is the interaction between [the “county”
income tax and the “special nonresident” tax] that renders Maryland’s tax scheme internally
inconsistent, Maryland could eliminate the inconsistency by terminating the special nonresident tax . . .
.”).
182
Id.
183
See id. (“There is, moreover, a deep flaw in the Court’s chosen test . . . Maryland could . . .
bring itself into compliance with the test at the heart of the Court’s analysis without removing the
double tax burden the test is purportedly designed to ‘cure.’”).
184
Id. at 1806 (majority opinion).
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Scalia took his last stand against the doctrine in this dissent, as he passed
away shortly thereafter.185 Ever so artfully,186 Justice Scalia took the
doctrine apart. He referred to it as a “judge-invented” rule,187 and used
numerous witty adjectives to display his scorn for the doctrine—calling it
“[s]ynthetic,” “[i]maginary,” “incoherent,” and a “brazen invention.”188
As usual, Justice Thomas adopted a more civil approach in displaying
his displeasure with the dormant Commerce Clause. Nonetheless, Justice
Thomas occasionally employed sarcasm in his historical analysis of
income taxation at the time of the Founding.189 He distinguished the
dormant Commerce Clause from the “actual Commerce Clause,”190
doubting that the doctrine truly exists.191 Overall, this dissent was nothing
new from Justice Thomas. The opinion contained citations to his previous
dissents and concurrences in dormant Commerce Clause cases,192 and
simply cemented his unique jurisprudential purity in opposition to the
doctrine.193
V.

THE NEW YORK CITY INCOME TAX IN LIGHT OF THE WYNNE
HOLDING

A. The New York Income Tax Statute
New York State levies a personal income tax194 consistent with the

185

Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2016, at A1.
186
At one point, he even invoked the famous philosopher Immanuel Kant to mock the internal
consistency test. See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1809 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“How did this exercise in
counterfactuals find its way into our basic charter? The test, it is true, bears some resemblance to
Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative: ‘Act only according to the maxim whereby you
can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’ without contradiction.”).
187
Id. at 1807. Justice Scalia is absolutely correct—the dormant Commerce Clause does not
explicitly appear in the Constitution. Obviously (as the Court still applies the doctrine), the majority of
the Court disagrees with Justice Scalia’s belief that this judicial invention is dangerous.
188
See id. at 1810–11 (referring to the dormant Commerce Clause as both the “Synthetic
Commerce Clause” and the “Imaginary Commerce Clause”); id. at 1808 (referring to the doctrine as
“incoherent” and a “brazen invention”). Justice Scalia was much less flamboyant in his criticism of the
doctrine in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Wash. St. Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987). See id. at
254–65 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining the flaws of the internal consistency test and discussing his
opposition to the dormant Commerce Clause).
189
See, e.g., Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1811 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (“[T]he Court
proves how far our negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence has departed from the actual Commerce
Clause.”); id. at 1813 (“Even if one assumed that the negative Commerce Clause existed . . .”).
190
Id. at 1811 (emphasis added).
191
See id. at 1813 (“Even if one assumed that the negative Commerce Clause existed . . . ”).
192
Id. at 1811.
193
See supra Section III.B (explaining that Justice Thomas would refuse to strike down any state
law under the dormant Commerce Clause, even one that is facially discriminatory).
194
N.Y. TAX LAW § 601 (McKinney 2018).
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195

national pattern of taxing residents on their worldwide income196 and
nonresidents on their sourced income.197 New York also authorizes (by
statute) cities with over one million inhabitants to levy a city income tax.198
While New York provides taxpayers a credit for income taxes paid to other
states against the State income tax,199 it does not allow its resident
taxpayers to credit income taxes paid to other states against the City
income tax.200
Without statutory authorization from the State, New York City would
not have the power to tax.201 The New York Court of Appeals has held that
under the New York Constitution: (1) “[t]he power to tax . . . rests solely
with the Legislature;”202 (2) “the exclusive power of taxation is lodged in
the State Legislature;”203 (3) “municipalities such as the City of New York
have no inherent taxing power, but only that which is delegated by the
State;”204 and (4) “[a]ll taxing power in the State of New York is vested in
the Legislature pursuant to section 1 of article III and section 1 of article
XVI of [the] State Constitution.”205 While the State’s taxing power is
exclusive, “[t]he Legislature [can] . . . delegate authority to assess and
collect taxes to a city . . .,”206 but “th[at] delegation of State taxing power . .
. must be made in express terms by enabling legislation.”207 New York
State exercises this exact power of delegation by permitting New York
City to impose a personal income tax via statute.208 Therefore, the City
income tax is part of, not independent of, the State income tax and thus
directly subject to the ruling in Wynne, as there is no distinction between

195

MORGAN SCARBORO, TAX FOUNDATION, STATE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES AND
BRACKETS FOR 2018 (2018), https://taxfoundation.org/state-individual-income-tax-rates-brackets-2018/
(“Forty-three states levy individual income taxes.”).
196
N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 611(a), 612(a) (McKinney 2018).
197
Id. § 631(a).
198
Id. § 1301(a)(1).
199
Id. § 620.
200
See id. § 1310 (listing permissible credits against income taxes imposed by cities, which does
not include income taxes paid to other states).
201
See Castle Oil Corp. v. City of N.Y., 675 N.E. 2d 840, 842 (N.Y. 1996) (“Under our form of
State government, the exclusive power of taxation is lodged in the State Legislature. A corollary to this
basic rule is that municipalities such as the City of New York have no inherent taxing power, but only
that which is delegated by the State.”) (citing N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; id. art. IX, § 2).
202
City of N.Y. v. State of N.Y., 730 N.E. 2d 920, 925 (N.Y. 2000); see also Greater
Poughkeepsie Library Dist. v. Town of Poughkeepsie, 618 N.E. 2d 127, 130 (N.Y. 1993) (“The power
to tax, of course, lies solely with the Legislature. This power is inherent in our form of government and
justified by legislative accountability to the electorate.”).
203
Castle Oil Corp. v. City of N.Y., 675 N.E. 2d 840, 842 (N.Y. 1996).
204
Id.
205
Sonmax, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 372 N.E. 2d 9, 11 (N.Y. 1977).
206
Id.
207
Castle Oil Corp., 675 N.E. 2d at 842.
208
N.Y. TAX LAW § 1301(a)(1) (McKinney 2018).
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state and local taxes for purposes of federal constitutional law.
Moreover, the language of the statute authorizing New York City to
levy a personal income tax demonstrates that the City income tax is part of
the State taxing regime. The provision reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary,
any city in this state having a population of one million or
more inhabitants, acting through its local legislative body, is
hereby authorized and empowered to adopt and amend local
law imposing in any such city, for taxable years beginning
after nineteen hundred and seventy-five: a tax on the personal
income of residents of such city, at the rates provided for
under subsection (a) of section thirteen hundred four of this
article. . . .210
According to this statute, New York City, like most municipalities,211 has
no power to tax other than what the State expressly grants it.212
The administration and collection of the New York City income tax
provide further evidence that it is inherently linked to, and part of, the State
taxing regime. A New York City resident’s City taxable income is identical
209
See Walter Hellerstein, Are State and Local Taxes Constitutionally Distinguishable?, 83 ST.
TAX NOTES 1091, 1092–93 (2017) (emphasis added) (“It is well settled . . . that any action by a
political subdivision of a state is subject to the same restraints that would be imposed on the state if the
state itself had taken the challenged action in question. Because political subdivisions of a state are
creatures of the state, their exercises of tax power are treated as the exercise of state tax power and
adjudicated according to the standards restraining the exercise of state tax power. In short, that the state
tax power is exercised by a political subdivision of the state rather than by the state itself is of no
constitutional moment.”); Brief of Michael S. Knoll and Ruth Mason as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 5 n.2, Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (No. 13485) (“The formal division by Maryland of its tax into ‘state’ and ‘county’ taxes has no effect on
constitutional analysis.”).
210
N.Y. TAX LAW § 1301(a)(1) (McKinney 2018) (emphasis added).
211
In some states, known as “home rule states,” municipalities (in certain circumstances) are
permitted to impose their own laws even absent express statutory approval from the state. See Jon D.
Russell & Aaron Bostrom, Federalism, Dillon and Home Rule, WHITE PAPER 1 (2016). The majority of
states, including New York, instead follow “Dillon’s Rule.” Id. at 8. Under Dillon’s Rule,
municipalities may enact their own laws only when the state expressly grants them the authority to do
so via statute. Id. at 1. Furthermore, the United States Constitution speaks only of the sovereignty of
states, not municipalities. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added) (“The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”). While states may delegate authority to their political subdivisions,
those subdivisions remain part of the state and are therefore subject to the same constitutional
limitations as the state. See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, WALTER HELLERSTEIN & JOHN A. SWAINE,
STATE TAXATION § 20.10 (5)(a)(i) (3d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2018-1) (“Insofar as federal constitutional
restraints limit state taxation of cross-border economic activity, it is irrelevant whether the tax in
question is imposed by the state itself or by one of its political subdivisions (for example, a city or a
county). The federal constitutional restraints apply in the same manner to both.”).
212
The key phrase in the statute making this clear reads, “[New York City] is hereby authorized
and empowered” in reference to a city’s authority to levy an income tax. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1301(a)(1)
(McKinney 2018).
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213

to his or her State taxable income. New York City residents pay both
their State and City income tax to the New York State Department of
Taxation and Finance on the same return:214 a taxpayer’s City income tax
liability is added to the amount owed in State income tax and the total
combined New York State and City income tax is paid in one amount to
the State. The State then remits to the City its share of the tax.215
Throughout the entire collection process, the State remains in complete
control. The City is passive—a mere depository for its statutory share of
income tax revenue collected by, and paid by, the State.
Additionally, the State delivers a notice of deficiency to allegedly
delinquent taxpayers, and conducts all appeal proceedings related to City
income tax liability.216 New York City’s Tax Appeals Tribunal only has
jurisdiction over taxes “administered by the City of New York.”217 The
New York City personal income tax is “administered by the [State] and
therefore, [is] not within the jurisdiction of the [New York City Tax
Appeals Tribunal].”218 Likewise, the same statute of limitations applies to
refund claims and income tax assessments related to the State and City
income tax.219 Furthermore, all civil penalties imposed on a taxpayer for
failure to comply with State income tax laws are similarly imposed for the
failure to comply with City income tax laws.220 Finally, the New York
State Department of Taxation and Finance issues regulations that apply to
both the State and City personal income tax.221
The dispositive holdings of New York’s highest court and the indicia
evidencing State control over the City income tax support the conclusion
that the New York City income tax is unambiguously part of the State
income tax. In accordance with general principles of federal constitutional
law, the constitutionality of the New York City income tax depends not on
whether the tax is internally consistent and non-discriminatory in isolation,
but instead on whether it is non-discriminatory when viewed in tandem

213

Id. § 1303.
Id. § 1312(a). New York City even advertises this on its own self-help website. CITY OF NEW
YORK, NEW YORK CITY PERSONAL INCOME TAX, https://perma.cc/7MJY-7H8H (last visited Dec. 14,
2018) (“The [New York City personal income tax] is administered and collected by the New York State
Department of Taxation and Finance.”).
215
N.Y. TAX LAW § 1313(c) (McKinney 2018).
216
Id. § 1312(a).
217
New York City Tax Appeals Tribunal Annual Report July 1, 2016–June 30, 2017, NYC TAX
APPEALS TRIBUNAL,
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/taxappeals/downloads/pdf/annual_report_20162017.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2018).
218
Id.
219
N.Y. TAX LAW § 1312(a) (McKinney 2018).
220
Id.
221
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 290.2 (West 2018).
214
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222

with the New York State income tax.

B. The New York City Income Tax Is Internally Consistent when Viewed
in Isolation, but that Description Is Irrelevant to the Constitutional
Analysis
The New York City income tax is internally consistent when viewed in
isolation,223 which leads to confusion about the constitutionality of denying
a credit for income taxes paid to other states. Even though New York City
does not grant taxpayers a credit for income taxes paid to other states,224 it
refrains from taxing nonresidents225—exactly the hypothetical226 Justice

222

See Hellerstein, Are State and Local Taxes Constitutionally Distinguishable?, supra note 211,
at 1097 (emphasis added) (“In addition to evaluating federal constitutional restraints on state and local
taxation of cross-border economic activity at the state level . . . one should also evaluate these restraints
in light of the state’s tax structure as a whole. To avoid any misunderstanding of this point, it is
important to make clear that when I say ‘evaluate the tax in light of the state tax structure as a whole,’ I
mean only that the constitutional analysis should view the exercise of tax power by the state or its
political subdivisions collectively rather than subjecting each state or local exaction to an
individualized inquiry without regard to the existence of other exactions imposed under state
authority.”).
223
Two leading scholars believe, however, that New York’s rules for determining residency are
internally inconsistent and therefore unconstitutional. This particular issue is outside the scope of this
Note. For an in-depth analysis of the constitutionality of New York’s tax residence rules, see Michael
S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, New York’s Unconstitutional Tax Residence Rule, 85 ST. TAX NOTES 707
(2017). Professor Zelinsky disagrees with important aspects of Professors Ruth Mason and Michael S.
Knoll’s constitutional analysis. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Double Taxing Dual Residents: A Response to
Knoll and Mason, 86 ST. TAX NOTES 677, 678 (2017) (“I am thus less eager than Knoll and Mason to
deploy Wynne and the dormant Commerce Clause nondiscrimination principle to remedy the double
state income taxation of dual residents. It would be best for this problem to be solved by Congress or
by the states themselves.”). For Professors Mason and Knoll’s response to Professor Zelinsky’s
argument, see Michael S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, Dual Residents: A Sur-Reply to Zelinsky, 87 ST. TAX
NOTES 269 (2018).
224
See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1310 (McKinney 2018) (listing permissible credits against income taxes
imposed by cities, which does not include income taxes paid to other states).
225
Id. § 1302(a). New York City used to tax nonresidents via a “Commuter Tax.” See New York’s
Highest Court Holds Commuter Tax Unconstitutional, ROBERTS & HOLLAND LLP, Apr. 4, 2000,
https://www.robertsandholland.com/news-page?itemid=87 (“For more than 30 years the New York
City ‘Commuter Tax’ was imposed on individuals who worked in New York City but lived
elsewhere.”). Legislators from upstate New York succeeded in eliminating the Commuter Tax, but only
for nonresidents of New York City who were New York State residents. See id. (“[B]owing to the
exigencies of a tight Rockland County election, the State passed legislation to repeal the Commuter
Tax for individuals living in the New York suburbs.”). Under the amended Commuter Tax, New York
City nonresidents living in, say, Connecticut or New Jersey (and working in New York City) were
subject to the Commuter Tax, but New York City nonresidents living elsewhere in New York State
(and working in New York City) were not. See id. (“Individuals who worked in the City but lived in
New Jersey, Connecticut, or any other state were still required to pay the tax.”). The New York Court
of Appeals held the amended Commuter Tax unconstitutional under both the Privileges and Immunities
Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause. City of N.Y. v. State of N.Y., 94 N.Y. 2d 577, 596, 598
(N.Y. 2000). Instead of reinstating the original Commuter Tax, the State decided to repeal it altogether.
Thus, New York City no longer taxes nonresidents.
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Ginsburg raised in her Wynne dissent.
A simple example illustrates why the New York City income tax is
internally consistent when viewed in isolation, and how New York City’s
decision not to tax nonresidents creates this internal consistency. Assume
two unmarried taxpayers (Avril and Rob) are both residents of New York
City. Avril earns $1,000,000 solely in New York City, whereas Rob earns
$1,000,000 solely in a neighboring city, Newark, New Jersey. The
assumption under the internal consistency test is that Newark has an
identical income tax statute to that of New York City (if viewed in
isolation)—that is, it does not tax nonresidents like Rob.
Under the New York State income tax statute, both taxpayers pay New
York City income tax at an average rate of approximately 3.9 percent.228
Thus, Avril and Rob each pay $39,000 in income taxes to New York
City.229 Avril, who is engaged in intrastate commerce, would bear an equal
income tax burden as Rob, who is engaged in interstate commerce.230
226
See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1822 (2015) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“Because it is the interaction between [the county income tax and the special nonresident
tax] that renders Maryland’s tax scheme internally inconsistent, Maryland could eliminate the
inconsistency by terminating the special nonresident tax . . .”). For example, if Maryland were to repeal
the special nonresident tax (as Justice Ginsburg suggests in this hypothetical), only Maryland residents
would pay the county income tax. Nonresidents would pay the State income tax on their Maryland
sourced income, but would not pay the county income tax at all. Similarly, New York State taxes
nonresidents on income sourced in the State, but does not subject nonresidents to the City income tax
(even on income sourced in New York City). Thus, the structure of Justice Ginsburg’s hypothetical
Maryland income tax scheme is identical to that of the actual New York income tax scheme.
227
See supra Section IV.C (analyzing Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Wynne). This Author remains
skeptical that Justice Ginsburg’s so-called hypothetical was truly hypothetical. Justice Ginsburg was
born in Brooklyn, graduated from Columbia Law School, and lived in New York City during law
school. Current Members, SUP. CT. OF THE UNITED STATES, https://perma.cc/C5SN-7UFU (last visited
Dec. 14, 2018). Her husband was the renowned tax lawyer Martin Ginsburg who practiced law at Weil,
Gotshal & Manges—a prominent law firm founded and headquartered in New York City. T. Rees
Shapiro, Martin D. Ginsburg Dies at 78; Tax Law Expert, Supreme Court Spouse, WASH. POST (June
28, 2010), https://perma.cc/9QFT-ET25. Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg and her husband litigated (and
won) a famous tax case regarding gender discrimination in which the Tenth Circuit held a provision of
the Internal Revenue Code unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause. Moritz v. Comm’r of
Internal Revenue, 469 F.2d 466, 470 (10th Cir. 1972). Justice Ginsburg most likely has at least some
knowledge of the New York City income tax because she probably paid it.
228
N.Y. TAX LAW § 1304(a)(3)(A) (McKinney 2018); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN.,
NEW YORK CITY TAX RATE SCHEDULE, https://perma.cc/T66J-C8M5 (last visited Dec. 14, 2018).
Under this subsection, resident unmarried taxpayers who earn over $50,000 owe “$1,813 plus 3.876%
of excess over $50,000” to New York City in income taxes—approximately a 3.9 percent average tax
rate. Id. For simplicity purposes, all examples herein will assume that Avril and Rob do not take any
deductions.
229
Rob is assumed to owe no income tax to Newark on his Newark sourced income. In an internal
consistency inquiry, that City, like New York City, is presumed to refrain from taxing nonresidents
altogether.
230
After Wynne and Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, it is clear that Rob is
engaged in interstate commerce. See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787,
1804 (2015) (emphasis added) (referencing the Maryland income tax scheme’s “discriminatory

2018]

LESSONS FROM WYNNE

1109

Consequently, the New York City income tax, taken in isolation, is
internally consistent. Despite its label, however, the New York City
income tax is part of the State income tax system. Therefore, the preceding
inquiry is misleading because it is constitutionally irrelevant.
C. The Internally Consistent New York City Income Tax is Nonetheless
Discriminatory when Viewed in Tandem with the State Income Tax
An internally consistent tax can nonetheless be discriminatory—a
proposition that was not before the Court in Wynne.231 A finding of internal
consistency does not automatically end the constitutional inquiry. Even
though the New York income tax scheme is internally consistent, New
York’s refusal to allow a credit for income taxes paid to other states against
the City portion of its State income tax nonetheless discriminates against
interstate commerce, violating the third prong of Complete Auto. An
analysis of the Court’s discrimination case law, the economic analysis the
Court endorsed in Wynne, and the relevant scholarly literature that supports
this conclusion follows.
1. The Discrimination Case Law
The third prong of Complete Auto—the discrimination prong—focuses
on a tax’s practical effects as opposed to its inherent structure, which is the
subject of the internal consistency doctrine developed under the
apportionment prong. Recognizing this important distinction, the Supreme
Court, lower federal courts, and state courts have held internally consistent
state tax provisions unconstitutional under Complete Auto’s discrimination
prong.
For example, in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, the Supreme
treatment of interstate commerce,” implying that the Wynnes’ activities constituted interstate
commerce); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 573 (1997)
(explaining that the “transportation of persons across state lines . . . has long been recognized as a form
of ‘commerce.’”).
231
See, e.g., HELLERSTEIN, HELLERSTEIN & SWAINE, supra note 213, at § 8.02(1)(ia)(ii) (3d ed.
2001 & Supp. 2018-1) (explaining that “a fair reading” of the cases cited by the Wynne majority “does
not support the proposition that ‘internal consistency’ is the exclusive test . . . for determining the risk
of the exposure to unconstitutional multiple tax burdens under the dormant Commerce Clause.”); id. §
8.02(1)(ia)(i) (emphasis added) (“If the Court believes that Moorman controls the outcome in Wynne,
then internal consistency may well be a sine qua non of a claim that a tax that creates the risk of
multiple taxation is prohibited by the dormant Commerce Clause in a post-Wynne world. But if Wynne
is so read, it reflects a significant departure from our prior precedent.”). Professor Zelinsky, while
skeptical of the Court’s state tax discrimination jurisprudence, acknowledges that the internal
consistency test is better served as a test of fair apportionment than as a test of discrimination. Zelinsky,
supra note 90, at 810–12. For a further explanation of Professor Zelinsky’s skepticism of the dormant
Commerce Clause non-discrimination principle, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Essay, The Incoherence of
Dormant Commerce Clause Nondiscrimination: A Rejoinder to Professor Denning, 77 MISS. L.J. 653
(2007).
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Court held that a corporate franchise tax credit measured by the amount of
exports shipped from an in-state location discriminated against interstate
export shipping and therefore offended the dormant Commerce Clause.232
The Court explained that the credit “ha[d] the effect of treating differently
parent corporations that are similarly situated in all respects except for the
percentage of their . . . shipping activities conducted from New York.”233
In so doing, the “tax scheme ‘provide[d] a positive incentive for increased
business activity in New York State,’ . . . but also . . . penalize[d] increases
in the [corporation’s] shipping activities in other States.”234 This tax
provision, albeit discriminatory, would nonetheless be internally consistent
because if every state adopted an identical credit, a corporation shipping
products from any state would receive the same corporate franchise tax
treatment.
Additionally, in Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., the Sixth Circuit held
that an Ohio corporate franchise tax credit for “purchases [of] new
manufacturing machinery and equipment . . . [that] are installed in
[Ohio]”235 discriminated against interstate commerce, violating the
dormant Commerce Clause.236 The court agreed with the plaintiffs’
argument that the investment tax credit “discriminate[d] against interstate
economic activity by coercing businesses already subject to the Ohio
franchise tax to expand locally rather than out-of-state.”237 This tax
provision, like that in Westinghouse, is nevertheless internally consistent. If
every state adopted an identical credit, a corporation purchasing new
manufacturing machinery and equipment would receive the credit
regardless of where that corporation decided to install the machinery and
equipment. The credit would be internally consistent, but nonetheless
discriminatory.
Furthermore, in Beatrice Cheese, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of
Revenue, the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission held that an accelerated
depreciation deduction from the corporate income tax limited to property
located in Wisconsin discriminated against interstate commerce.238 The
commission explained that “the Wisconsin depreciation deduction statutes
at issue [were] obviously ‘designed to have discriminatory economic
232

Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 407 (1984).
Id. at 400.
234
Id. at 400–01.
235
Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2004).
236
Id. at 746. While the Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Cuno, it did so on
standing grounds. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 547 U.S. 332, 346 (2006). The Court never addressed
the merits of the case.
237
Cuno, 386 F.3d at 743; see id. at 746 (“In short, while we may be sympathetic to efforts by the
City of Toledo to attract industry into its economically depressed areas, we conclude that Ohio’s
investment tax credit cannot be upheld under the [dormant Commerce Clause].”).
238
Beatrice Cheese, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, Docket Nos. 91-I-100, 91-I-101, 91-I-102,
1993 WL 57202, at *3 (Wis. Tax App. Comm’n Feb. 24, 1993).
233
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effects’ on corporations locating property outside the state by taxing such
corporations more heavily than those locating such property in the state.”239
The accelerated depreciation deduction in Beatrice Cheese is yet another
internally consistent state tax provision that a court nonetheless held to be
discriminatory. If every state enacted an identical provision, all
corporations would receive the favorable deduction for their property
regardless of location. Thus, in an internal consistency inquiry,
corporations engaged in interstate commerce would not bear a greater
corporate income tax burden than corporations engaged in intrastate
commerce, yet the court held the deduction to be discriminatory.
Likewise, in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. City of New York
Department of Finance, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court held that “a corporate taxing provision of the New York City
administrative code that disallow[ed] a[n] [accelerated] depreciation
deduction for property placed in service out of New York, while allowing
such a deduction for property located within New York”240 discriminated
against interstate commerce, violating the dormant Commerce Clause.241
The court expressed that New York City’s refusal to allow an accelerated
depreciation deduction for out-of-state property “effectively reward[ed] . . .
in-State business by postponing the full weight of the tax . . . [and]
provide[d] a disincentive to invest a New York business’[] resources in
property out of State.”242 This provision, albeit discriminatory, would
satisfy the internal consistency test. In a hypothetical world where every
state adopted an identical tax, all corporations would receive the favorable
deduction regardless of the state in which they placed property into service.
A New York corporation with property in New Jersey would bear no
greater corporate franchise tax burden than a New York corporation with
property in New York. Thus, the deduction would be internally consistent,
yet discriminatory.
As the Supreme Court explained in Boston Stock Exchange v. State
Tax Commission, discriminatory taxes are those that “‘foreclose[] taxneutral decisions’ about where to transact business,”243 which is the effect
of New York’s failure to provide a credit against the City income tax. The
State’s refusal to extend its credit for income taxes paid to other states
against the City income tax also bears other indicia of a discriminatory tax,
including: (1) “providing a direct commercial advantage to local
239

Id. at *4.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. City of N.Y. Dep’t of Fin., 667 N.Y.S.2d 4, 5 (App. Div. 1997).
241
Id. at 9, 11.
242
Id. at 9–10.
243
Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State
Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 427 (1996) (quoting Boston Stock Exch. v. State
Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977)).
240
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business;”
(2) “encourag[ing] the development of local industry by
means of taxing measures that impose[] greater burdens on economic
activities taking place outside the State than were placed on similar
activities within the State;”245 (3) “[inducing] ‘business operations to be
performed in the home State that could more efficiently be performed
elsewhere;’”246 and (4) “‘provid[ing] a positive incentive for increased
business activity [in-state],’ [while] also . . . penaliz[ing] increase[d]
[business activity] in other State[s].”247
The “Avril and Rob Discrimination Example” below illustrates the
discriminatory nature of the New York income tax scheme in reality, as
opposed to the imaginary cloned248 world of internal consistency. Assume
two unmarried taxpayers (Avril and Rob) are both New York City
residents. Avril earns $1,000,000 solely in New York City, whereas Rob
earns $1,000,000 solely in another state (the “Source State”) where his
average income tax rate is identical to that of the combined New York
State and City rates. Avril and Rob each pay New York State and City
income tax at an average combined rate of 10.7 percent.249 Avril would pay
$107,000 in combined income taxes to New York—$68,000 on the State
portion and $39,000 on the City portion. Rob would owe $107,000 in
income taxes to the Source State and $107,000 in combined income taxes
to New York pre-credit—$68,000 on the State portion and $39,000 on the
City portion. Rob could wholly eliminate the State portion of the New
York income tax by using $68,000 of his $107,000 credit for income taxes
paid to the Source State. New York law, however, does not permit Rob to
apply his excess credit of $39,000 to eliminate the City portion of the New
244

Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 268 (1984).
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 404 (1984) (citing Boston Stock Exch., 429
U.S. at 332).
246
Id. at 406 (quoting Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 336).
247
Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business
Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789, 801 (1996) (quoting Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at
400–01).
248
For the Court’s use of the term “cloning” to describe the internal consistency test, see Okla.
Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995) (emphasis added) (“External
consistency, on the other hand, looks not to the logical consequences of cloning, but to the economic
justification for the State’s claim upon the value taxed . . .”).
249
Avril and Rob each pay New York City income tax at an average rate of approximately 3.9
percent. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1304(a)(3)(A) (McKinney 2018); New York City Tax Rate Schedule, N.Y.
ST.
DEP’T
OF
TAXATION
&
FIN.,
https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/current_forms/it/nyc_tax_rate_schedule.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2018).
Avril and Rob each pay New York State income tax at an average rate of approximately 6.8 percent.
See N.Y. TAX LAW § 601(c)(1)(A) (McKinney 2018); New York State Tax Rate Schedule, N.Y. ST.
DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN., https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/current_forms/it/it201i_tax_rate_schedule.pdf
(last visited Jan. 30, 2018) (requiring unmarried resident taxpayers with New York taxable income
between $215,400 and $1,077,550 to pay “$13,825 plus 6.85% of excess over $215,400” in income
taxes). Therefore, Avril and Rob each pay New York State and City income tax at a total average rate
of 10.7 percent.
245
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York income tax. As a result, Rob (who is engaged in interstate commerce)
would bear a greater total income tax burden than Avril (who is engaged in
intrastate commerce)—Rob pays a total of $146,000 in income taxes,
whereas Avril pays a total of $107,000 in income taxes. In this simple
example, the New York system discriminates in favor of in-state activity at
the expense of out-of-state activity.
In its practical effects, not only is the New York income tax scheme
essentially equivalent to an impermissible state tariff like the Maryland
scheme in Wynne,250 but it also bears further characteristics of a state tax
that discriminates in favor of intrastate activity. In the Avril and Rob
Discrimination Example above, New York’s income tax favors intrastate
commerce, which, like the discriminatory tax in Boston Stock Exchange,
prevents Rob from having a tax-neutral choice about whether to engage in
interstate or intrastate commerce. Additionally, like the tax the Court
deemed discriminatory in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, the New York
income tax scheme provides Avril with a direct economic advantage over
Rob merely for earning income intrastate. It encourages Rob to earn
income solely in New York by imposing a greater income tax burden on
economic activities taking place out-of-state. Furthermore, like in
Westinghouse, the New York income tax regime not only “provide[s]” Rob
with “a positive incentive” to engage in intrastate activity, but also
“penalizes” the activity he undertakes in other states.251 Thus, consistent
with the Court’s discrimination case law, the New York City income tax
discriminates against interstate commerce when viewed in tandem with the
New York State income tax, of which it is a part.
2. The Economic Analysis the Court Endorsed in Wynne
In Wynne, the Court endorsed the “undisputed” economic analysis252
that the tax economists and Professors Ruth Mason and Michael S. Knoll
articulated in two separate amicus briefs.253 This economic analysis further
evidences the discriminatory nature of the New York income tax regime.
Both of these amicus briefs developed a formula that establishes
whether a state tax discriminates against interstate commerce.254 Professors
250

Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1792 (2015).
Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at 401.
252
See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1804 (citing favorably the “undisputed economic analysis” explained
in the two amicus briefs).
253
Brief of the Tax Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Comptroller of the
Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (No. 13-485); Brief of Michael S. Knoll and Ruth
Mason as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135
S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (No. 13-485).
254
Id. at 14; Brief of the Tax Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 8–15,
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (No. 13-485). The tax economists’ equation is identical to that of Professors
Mason and Knoll, which is explained in greater depth and expressed as a mathematical formula in
Michael S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, The Economic Foundation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 103
251
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Mason and Knoll refer to this formula as “Competitive Neutrality,”255
whereas Ryan Lirette and economist Alan D. Viard term it “Commerce
Neutrality.”256 The Competitive Neutrality equation often reaches the same
result as the internal consistency test, but it does not always.257
Importantly, “[i]nternal consistency and Com[petitive] Neutrality diverge
if the state makes its tax rate dependent on other states’ tax policies.”258
The internal consistency test and the Competitive Neutrality framework
thus yield different results “when a state . . . [provides a] credit . . . for
taxes paid to other states.”259 New York State fits this description—it
provides a partial260 credit against its income tax for income taxes paid to
other states.261
The New York income tax system, albeit internally consistent,262 fails
the Competitive Neutrality equation in the Avril and Rob Discrimination
Example above. In order to satisfy Competitive Neutrality, “the sum of the
tax rates on inbound and outbound transactions, minus an interaction term,
must be less than or equal to the state’s tax on its intrastate transactions.”263
The interaction term is simply the inbound tax rate multiplied by the
outbound tax rate.264 In the Avril and Rob Discrimination Example, New
York’s tax rate on: (1) inbound transactions to New York City is 6.8
percent,265 (2) outbound transactions from New York City is 10.7
VA. L. REV. 309, 323 (2017) and Ryan Lirette & Alan D. Viard, Putting the Commerce Back in the
Dormant Commerce Clause: State Taxes, State Subsidies, and Commerce Neutrality, 24 J. L. & POL’Y
467, 483 (2016).
255
Knoll & Mason, The Economic Foundation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, supra note
256, at 318–23.
256
Lirette & Viard, supra note 256, at 470. Lirette and Viard probably use the term “Commerce
Neutrality” instead of Competitive Neutrality to tie the formula to the dormant Commerce Clause. See
id. at 545 (emphasis added) (“Commerce Neutrality puts the commerce back in the dormant
[C]ommerce [C]lause.”).
257
See id. at 471 (emphasis added) (“[I]n most circumstances, Commerce Neutrality is identical
to the Court’s oft-used internal consistency test.”).
258
Id. at 499.
259
Id. at 507.
260
See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1310 (McKinney 2018) (listing permissible credits against income taxes
imposed by New York cities, which does not include income taxes paid to other states).
261
Id. § 620.
262
See supra Section V.B (explaining that the New York City income tax is internally consistent).
263
Lirette & Viard, supra note 256.
264
Id.
265
New York State taxes nonresidents on their income sourced in the State, but nonresidents are
not subject to the New York City income tax. N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 631(a), 1302(a) (McKinney 2018).
Using the same numbers as the Avril and Rob Discrimination Example, say Sam, an unmarried
nonresident taxpayer, earns $1,000,000 in New York City. He would pay New York State income tax
at an average rate of 6.8%, but would not pay any New York City income tax. See id. § 601(e)(2)
(explaining that unmarried nonresidents are subject to the same personal income tax rates as unmarried
residents); id. § 601(c)(1)(A) (detailing New York’s personal income tax rates on unmarried resident
individuals); New York State Tax Rate Schedule, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN.,
https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/current_forms/it/it201i_tax_rate_schedule.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2018)
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percent, and (3) intrastate transactions is 10.7 percent.
Simple algebra demonstrates that the New York taxing scheme flunks
the Competitive Neutrality equation in the Avril and Rob Discrimination
Example. The sum of 6.8 percent (inbound tax rate) and 10.7 percent
(outbound tax rate)268 minus the product of 6.8 percent (inbound tax rate)
and 10.7 percent (outbound tax rate)269 results in competitive distortion, not
neutrality.270 Thus, the economic analysis that the Wynne majority
endorsed reveals that New York’s internally consistent taxing regime
nonetheless discriminates against interstate commerce and therefore
violates the dormant Commerce Clause.
3. Scholarly Theories on Discriminatory State Tax Provisions
There are three theories proposed by leading scholars to determine
whether state business tax incentives that discriminate against interstate
commerce violate the dormant Commerce Clause: (1) Professors Walter
Hellerstein and Dan T. Coenen’s Coercive Powers Theory;271 (2) Professor
Peter D. Enrich’s Economic Distortion Theory;272 and (3) Professor Philip
M. Tatarowicz’s Permissible Burdens Theory.273 While these theories
focus on business tax incentives, they can be similarly deployed to analyze
the constitutionality of the New York City income tax, as both business tax
incentives and the New York City income tax can be internally consistent.
(requiring unmarried resident taxpayers with New York taxable income between $215,400 and
$1,077,550 to pay “$13,825 plus 6.85% of excess over $215,400” in income taxes). Thus, New York’s
tax rate on inbound transactions to New York City for purposes of the Competitive Neutrality equation
would be 6.8%.
266
In the Avril and Rob Discrimination Example, Rob represents a taxpayer paying tax on
outbound transactions. He is an unmarried New York City resident who earns $1,000,000 solely in
another state. He pays combined New York State and City income tax at an average rate of 10.7
percent. See supra Section V.C.1, note 251 and accompanying text (calculating Rob’s average
combined New York State and City income tax rate). Thus, New York’s average tax rate on outbound
transactions from New York City for purposes of the Competitive Neutrality equation would be 10.7
percent.
267
In the Avril and Rob Discrimination Example, Avril represents a taxpayer paying tax on
intrastate transactions. She is an unmarried New York City resident who earns $1,000,000 solely in
New York City. She pays combined New York State and City income tax at an average rate of 10.7
percent. See id. (calculating Avril’s average combined New York State and City income tax rate). Thus,
New York’s average tax rate on intrastate transactions for purposes of the Competitive Neutrality
equation would be 10.7 percent.
268
This equals 17.5 percent or 0.175.
269
This equals 0.7276 percent or 0.007276.
270
16.7724 percent is greater than, not less than or equal to, 10.7 percent. Therefore, under the
economic analysis that the Court endorsed in Wynne, the internally consistent New York income tax
regime is nonetheless discriminatory.
271
Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 247.
272
Enrich, supra note 243.
273
Philip M. Tatarowicz, Federalism, The Commerce Clause, and Discriminatory State Tax
Incentives: A Defense of Unconditional Business Tax Incentives Limited to In-State Activities of the
Taxpayer, 60 TAX. LAW. 835 (2007).
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For example, if every state offered an identical income tax credit to
businesses that invest solely in-state, businesses engaged in interstate
commerce would not bear a greater total income tax burden than
businesses engaged in intrastate commerce. The tax incentive would satisfy
the internal consistency test, but would nonetheless be discriminatory. A
discussion of the scholarly literature follows.
i.

Professors Walter Hellerstein and Dan T. Coenen’s Coercive
Powers Theory

In Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., the Sixth Circuit adopted a theory on
discriminatory state tax incentives proposed by Professors Hellerstein and
Coenen.274 This theory focuses on the “coercive power of the state.”275
Under this Coercive Powers Theory, states impermissibly coerce taxpayers
via tax incentives that apply to existing tax liabilities, but not through the
use of tax incentives that apply to additional, or new, tax liabilities.276 An
example of a permissible non-coercive state tax incentive is a property tax
exemption for the in-state construction of a new building.277 The state’s
property tax would be an additional tax liability because the taxpayer
would not be subject to the tax unless it engaged in in-state construction.
The state is not offering to lower an already existing property tax liability
in exchange for in-state development, but it is instead proposing a reprieve
from “any additional property tax burdens.”278 Such a tax exemption would
not implicate the coercive power of the state, and would not favor in-state
over out-of-state investment in a “constitutionally []relevant” way.279
For current state residents, however, a personal income tax is an
existing tax liability. Therefore, a state personal income tax provision that
coerces taxpayers into earning income solely intrastate violates the
Coercive Powers Theory, internal consistency notwithstanding. New York
City residents are subject to the State and City income tax regardless of the
source of their income, that is, the New York income tax is an existing tax
obligation.
274
See Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 743–46 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Professors
Hellerstein and Coenen’s theory affirmatively).
275
Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 247, at 806.
276
See id. at 807 (emphasis added) (“At least one significant category of tax incentives, however,
should escape invalidation: those tax incentives framed not as exemptions from or reductions of
existing state tax liability but rather as exemptions from or reductions of additional state tax liability to
which the taxpayer would be subjected only if the taxpayer were to engage in the targeted activity in
the state. In our judgment, such incentives neither favor in-state over out-of-state investment (except in
a sense that should be constitutionally irrelevant) nor do they rely on the coercive power of the state to
compel a choice favoring in-state investment.”).
277
See id. ([A] real property tax exemption for new construction in a state would pass muster . .
.”)
278
Id. at 808.
279
Id. at 807.
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Returning to the Avril and Rob Discrimination Example above, New
York’s defective partial credit results in a greater total income tax burden
for Rob, a taxpayer engaged in interstate commerce, than for Avril, a
taxpayer earning income solely intrastate. As a result, New York’s refusal
to grant a credit for income taxes paid to other states against the City
portion of its State income tax impermissibly coerces taxpayers into
earning income solely in New York. Consequently, New York’s defective
partial credit fails Professors Hellerstein and Coenen’s Coercive Powers
Theory, and thus, consistent with their theory, would impermissibly
discriminate against interstate commerce.
ii.

Professor Peter D. Enrich’s Economic Distortion Theory

Professor Enrich’s Economic Distortion Theory is more skeptical of
the constitutionality of state business tax incentives than the Coercive
Powers Theory. The Economic Distortion Theory views “business location
incentives [as] virtually per se unconstitutional.”280 Under this theory, tax
incentives that “distort[] economic decision[-]making in favor of in-state
activity” would violate the dormant Commerce Clause.281
New York’s refusal to grant a credit for income taxes paid to other
states against the City portion of its State income tax violates the Economic
Distortion Theory. In the Avril and Rob Discrimination Example above, a
taxpayer engaged in interstate commerce (Rob) bears a greater total
income tax burden than one earning income solely in New York (Avril),
which impermissibly distorts economic decision-making in favor of
intrastate activity. New York’s defective partial credit encourages Rob to
earn income in New York (as opposed to the Source State), as Avril, a
taxpayer earning precisely the same amount of income, bears a lower total
income tax burden merely because she earns that income in New York.
Therefore, consistent with Professor Enrich’s theory, New York’s income
tax regime discriminates against interstate commerce, violating the
dormant Commerce Clause.
iii.

Professor Philip M. Tatarowicz’s Permissible Burdens Theory

Professor Tatarowicz’s Permissible Burdens Theory is more
deferential to state business tax incentives than either the Coercive Powers
Theory or the Economic Distortion Theory. The Permissible Burdens
Theory creates a constitutional “safe harbor” for “unconditional . . .
business tax incentives . . . limited to [the] in-state activities of the taxpayer
. . . used by a state to . . . primarily compete for economic development.”282
This theory does not address the constitutionality of state tax provisions
280

Enrich, supra note 243, at 458.
Id. at 456.
282
Tatarowicz, supra note 275, at 882.
281
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283

that fall outside of the safe harbor.
The relevant provision of the New York income tax scheme does not
fall within Professor Tatarowicz’s safe harbor. The Permissible Burdens
Theory therefore does not shield it from invalidation. Namely, New York’s
defective partial credit is not limited to in-state activities. It both rewards
in-state economic activity and penalizes taxpayers by imposing a greater
total income tax burden for earning income in another state. As a result,
New York’s defective partial credit does not receive per se protection from
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny even under this exceptionally
deferential standard.
4. Why Should New York Provide the Credit Instead of the Source
State?
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Wynne raised the question of whether the
residence state or the source state must address the possible double taxation
that results when two sovereigns exercise their legitimate taxing authority
over the same interstate activity.284 One might ask why New York, and not
the Source State, must address Rob’s greater total income tax burden in the
Avril and Rob Discrimination Example. The scholarly literature on
international tax discrimination, general principles of international
taxation, and the Court’s teaching in the sales and use tax context provide
support for the conclusion that a state taxing income based on residence
must grant a credit for income taxes paid to a source state to alleviate any
resulting double taxation.
i.

Professors Ruth Mason and Michael S. Knoll’s Competitive
Neutrality Principle

Professors Ruth Mason and Michael S. Knoll’s theory of tax
discrimination is consistent with this Note’s argument that New York, and
not the source state, must address the double taxation that results from the
imposition of an income tax by both the residence state and the source
state. According to Professors Mason and Knoll, non-discrimination in
both international and multistate taxation285 requires “[C]ompetitive
283
Id. at 839. Presumably, Professor Tatarowicz would prefer the courts to analyze taxes falling
outside the safe harbor under Pike’s balancing test or Complete Auto. See id. (“[T]ax incentives falling
outside the safe harbor . . . . are best left to the judicial process and its balancing of federalist interests
in light of each controversy’s unique facts and circumstances.”).
284
See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1813 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“As I see it, nothing in the Constitution or in prior decisions of this Court dictates that one
of two States, the domiciliary State or the source State, must recede simply because both have lawful
tax regimes reaching the same income.”).
285
See Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll, What is Tax Discrimination?, 121 YALE L.J. 1014, 1108
(2012) (“A second preliminary question is whether there is any reason to think that the
nondiscrimination principle in [the dormant Commerce Clause] would have the same meaning as the
EU nondiscrimination principle. We suggest that there is.”); Knoll & Mason, The Economic
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286

[N]eutrality,” which prevents states and foreign countries from adopting
“tax systems [that] distort which people occupy particular jobs.”287
States and foreign countries are competitively neutral if they “adopt
worldwide [income] taxation with unlimited credits for source taxes.”288
Under such an income tax scheme, “source taxes become irrelevant to
competition because they are effectively refunded by the residence state
through the unlimited credit.”289 This is precisely why New York, as
opposed to the Source State, must alleviate Rob’s greater total income tax
burden in the Avril and Rob Discrimination Example. New York taxes
residents on their worldwide income, but only grants a partial, as opposed
to an unlimited, credit for source taxes. As a result, it violates Professors
Mason and Knoll’s Competitive Neutrality principle—a concept they view
as the “benchmark” of non-discriminatory taxation.290
ii.

General Principles of International Taxation

Additionally, general principles of international taxation (and the
Court’s reference in Wynne to those same principles in the context of
multistate taxation)291 support the conclusion that states taxing income
based on residence must defer to states taxing income based on source
when both states have valid claims to taxing the same interstate activity.292
In the international context, countries taxing income based on residence
must “alleviate [the inevitable] double taxation” that arises when another
country taxes income based on source.293 For foreign sourced income, the
“source country’s economic environment is likely to have played a larger
role in the production of [that] income than the economic environment of
the residence [country].”294 Therefore, as countries consider source
Foundation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, supra note 256, at 318–23 (applying the Competitive
Neutrality principle in the context of state and local taxation).
286
Mason & Knoll, What is Tax Discrimination?, supra note 287, at 1014.
287
Id. at 1053.
288
Id. at 1060.
289
Id.
290
Id. at 1022.
291
Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1801 (2015); see Hellerstein,
Deciphering the Supreme Court’s Opinion in Wynne, supra note 149, at 9 (explaining that the Court
“recogni[zed] [in Wynne] that the source-trumps-residence principle reflect[s] ‘the near-universal state
practice,’ at least in the context of state personal income taxation.”).
292
Brief of The Maryland Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
8–9, Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015); see also Hellerstein,
Deciphering the Supreme Court’s Opinion in Wynne, supra note 149 (referring to the principle that “a
residence-based tax must yield to a source-based tax to avoid the multiple taxation that would result
from honoring both taxing claims in full” as a “generally accepted proposition, which appear[s] to be
solidly grounded in the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause precedents . . .”).
293
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF
UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION 6 (1987).
294
RICHARD L. DOERNBERG, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION IN A NUTSHELL 204 (8th ed. 2009).
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295

jurisdiction to be “primary,” the residence country will almost always
grant a credit for income taxes paid to the source country, which solves the
double taxation quandary.296 A credit against the residence country’s
income tax for income taxes paid to the source country both: (1) “improves
the fairness of the income tax by equalizing the tax burdens imposed on
U.S. persons engaged in [foreign commerce] with the tax burdens imposed
on otherwise similarly situated U.S. persons engaged only in domestic
[commerce],”297 and (2) “promote[s] the efficient use of capital by U.S.
persons by removing a tax penalty on income-producing activities
otherwise subject to a double tax.”298 By providing a credit, the residence
country remains neutral with respect to domestic and foreign commerce. It
does not encourage domestic commerce at the expense of foreign
commerce, and therefore does not impermissibly burden, or discriminate
against, international commerce. This position is consistent with that of
Professors Mason and Knoll.
The multi-jurisdictional issues that exist in international taxation are
similarly present in multistate taxation. As a result, the international
solution to the issue of double taxation—a credit against the residence
country’s income tax for income taxes paid to the source country—is
equally applicable in the context of multistate taxation, a proposition the
Court acknowledged in Wynne.299 Importantly, New York recognizes this
requirement and does provide a credit against its income tax for income
taxes paid to other states. What New York fails to do, however, is provide
a full credit for income taxes paid to other states, and, therefore, like
Maryland in Wynne, New York offers taxpayers a defective partial credit.
The Court implied in Wynne that the failure of a state to grant a full credit
against its income tax for income taxes paid to other states discriminates
against interstate commerce.300 That principle compels the conclusion that
295
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 295, at 7; see also DOERNBERG, supra note 296
(explaining that, for foreign sourced income, the source country has the “first crack at taxation, and if
any adjustment is to be made, the [residence country] must make it.”).
296
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 295, at 6.
297
MICHAEL J. MCINTYRE, THE INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAX RULES OF THE UNITED STATES 4101 (2d ed. 2000).
298
Id. at 4-101–4-102.
299
See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1801 (2015) (emphasis
added) (“[A]s our Commerce Clause jurisprudence [has] developed, the States have almost entirely
abandoned [protectionist regimes that favor intrastate over interstate commerce], perhaps in recognition
of their doubtful constitutionality. Today, the near-universal state practice is to provide credits against
personal income taxes for such taxes paid to other States.”) (citing 2 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN &
WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 20-163–20-164 (3d ed. 2003)).
300
Id.; see also HELLERSTEIN, HELLERSTEIN & SWAINE, supra note 213, at § 8.02(1)(a)(i) (“[W]e
believe the Commerce Clause does not deprive the state of all power to tax value to which another state
may lay a competing and stronger claim. Rather, the state retains the authority to exercise its wellestablished residence-based taxing rights, except to the extent that the exercise of such power in fact
creates a risk of multiple taxation. A properly designed credit fully satisfies that obligation, and the

2018]

LESSONS FROM WYNNE

1121

New York’s defective partial credit fails dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny.
iii.

The Court’s Teaching in the Sales and Use Tax Context

Finally, in the context of state sales and use taxes, the Court has
recognized that residence states, not source states, are tasked with
alleviating the inevitable double taxation that arises when two states can
tax the same underlying activity.301 The state of purchase in the sales and
use tax context is equivalent to the source state in the income tax context—
taxpayers in both situations are only subject to taxation because of, and
stemming from, the economic activities they conduct in a particular state.
Likewise, the state of use for purposes of sales and use taxes is equivalent
to the residence state for purposes of an income tax—taxpayers in both
contexts are subject to taxation merely because of where they happen to
maintain a residence.
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., the Court
explained that when a consumer purchases goods in one state and
transports those goods for use in another state, “that use of goods is taxed
[by the state of use] only to the extent that their prior sale has escaped
taxation.”302 While both states have a legitimate claim to tax the
consumer’s purchase of goods (either through a sales tax or use tax), due to
“the primacy of taxes on sales,” the state of use provides “a credit for [sales
taxes] paid [to the state of sale]” to “free [the purchaser] from multiple
taxation.”303
Furthermore, as the Court proclaimed in Henneford v. Silas Mason
Co., an earlier case upholding the constitutionality of Washington’s use
tax:
Equality is a theme that runs through all sections of the [sales
and use tax] statute. There shall be a tax upon the use, but
Commerce Clause demands no more. Whatever doubts there may have been prior to Wynne about this
proposition, Wynne has clearly removed them, at least in the context of personal income taxation by
observing that ‘Maryland could remedy the infirmity in its tax scheme by offering, as most States do, a
credit against income taxes paid to other States.’”). A “properly designed credit” is one that “in fact
eliminates the residence-based tax on the same value that is subject to tax in a jurisdiction with the
source-based or situs-based claim, up to the amount of the source-based or situs-based tax.” Id. §
8.02(1)(a)(i) n.39.1. New York’s credit is not “properly designed” because, in certain circumstances
(like the Avril and Rob Discrimination Example), it fails to fully “eliminate[] the residence-based tax
on the same value . . . subject to tax [by a source state].” Id.
301
See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 194 (1995) (emphasis added)
(“Since any use tax would have to comply with [the dormant Commerce Clause], the tax scheme could
not apply differently to goods and services purchased out of state from those purchased domestically.
Presumably, then, it would not apply when another State’s sales tax had previously been paid, or would
apply subject to credit for such payment.”).
302
Id.
303
Id.
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subject to an offset if another use or sales tax has been paid
for the same thing. This is true where the offsetting tax
became payable to Washington by reason of purchase or use
within the state. It is true in exactly the same measure where
the offsetting tax has been paid to another state by reason of
use or purchase there. No one who uses the property in
Washington after buying it at retail is to be exempt from a tax
upon the privilege of enjoyment except to the extent that he
has paid a use or sales tax somewhere. Every one who has
paid a use or sales tax anywhere, or, more accurately, in any
state, is to that extent to be exempt from the payment of
another tax in Washington.304
This concept ensures that “the stranger from afar is subject to no
greater burdens as a consequence of ownership than the dweller within the
gates.”305 The logical extension of this principle to income taxation would
mandate that the residence state provide a credit for income taxes paid to
the source state to alleviate multiple taxation—something New York fails
to do in full, as it only provides a credit for income taxes paid to other
states against a portion of its income tax.
D. New York State Should Not Fear a Significant Revenue Loss From
Granting a Full Rather than a Partial Credit
A constitutional challenge to the New York City income tax could only
arise in a narrow scenario. A taxpayer challenging the New York City
income tax would need an excess credit after crediting income taxes paid
to other states against the State portion of the New York income tax. That
is, the taxpayer must earn income sourced in a state with higher effective
income tax rates than New York. Otherwise, the taxpayer would simply
exhaust the credit by using it to reduce the State portion of his or her New
York income tax burden.
For example, if Rob, an unmarried New York City resident, earned
$1,000,000 of income sourced in a state where he paid income tax at an
average rate of 6 percent, he would owe $60,000 in income taxes to the
source state and $107,000 in income taxes to New York pre-credit—
$68,000 on the State portion and $39,000 on the City portion. Rob would
then exhaust his $60,000 credit for income taxes paid to the source state
against the State portion of the New York income tax. New York City’s
refusal to grant a credit for income taxes paid to other states would be
irrelevant because Rob would not have an excess credit to apply against his
New York City income tax liability.
304
305

Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 583–84 (1937) (emphasis added).
Id. at 584.
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In narrow circumstances, California, one of the very few states having
higher income tax rates than New York,306 could be the source state
generating a constitutional challenge to the New York income tax scheme
brought by a New York City resident. Certainly, some wealthy tech
executives and entertainment figures are New York City residents (and
nonresidents of California).
A challenge to the law would be factually straightforward. For
example, assume Alex (an unmarried New York City resident) earns
$1,000,000 of California sourced income.307 Further, assume Alex would
pay California income tax at an average rate of 10.9 percent308 and New
York State and City income tax at an average combined rate of 10.7
percent.309 He would owe $109,000 in income taxes to California and
$107,000 in income taxes to New York pre-credit—$68,000 on the State
portion and $39,000 on the City portion. He could use $68,000 of the
$109,000 credit for income taxes paid to California to wholly eliminate the
State portion of the New York income tax. Under New York law, however,
Alex could not use his excess credit of $41,000 to eliminate the City
306
Avril and Rob (individuals with $1,000,000 of taxable income) would each pay California
income tax at an average rate of approximately 10.9 percent. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17041(a)(1)
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 of 2018 Reg. Sess.); see 2017 California Tax Rates and Exemptions,
STATE OF CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, https://perma.cc/NS83-34DA (last visited Dec. 14, 2018)
(requiring unmarried taxpayers with income over $551,473 to pay $53,606.76 plus 12.3 percent of the
excess over $551,473 in income tax to California). For high earners, New Jersey’s income tax rates are
also higher than New York’s. For example, Avril and Rob would each pay New Jersey income tax at an
average rate of approximately 7.5 percent. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A:2–1 (West, Westlaw through
L.2017, c. 293 and J.R. No. 19); New Jersey Tax Rate Schedules 2017, STATE OF N.J. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, DIVISION OF TAX’N, https://perma.cc/BF98-KGAU (last visited Dec. 14, 2018) (requiring
unmarried taxpayers with income over $500,000 to pay income tax on 8.97 percent of their income
minus $15,126.25). Unlike California, however, New Jersey’s income tax rates are only slightly higher
than New York’s for wealthy individuals. The potential spoils of victory are likely to be too trivial in
most cases to justify litigation. Therefore, New Jersey is unlikely to be the source state in a
constitutional challenge to the New York income tax scheme brought by a New York City resident.
307
The numbers used in this hypothetical are merely for simplicity purposes—a taxpayer
challenging the law would likely have higher earnings. Otherwise, the costs of litigation might not be
worth the potential reduction in income tax liability.
308
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17041(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 of 2018 Reg. Sess.); see
2017 California Tax Rates and Exemptions, STATE OF CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD,
https://www.ftb.ca.gov/forms/2017-California-Tax-Rates-and-Exemptions.shtml (last visited Dec. 14,
2018) (requiring unmarried taxpayers with income over $551,473 to pay $53,606.76 plus 12.3 percent
of the excess over $551,473 in income tax to California).
309
N.Y. TAX LAW § 1304(a)(3)(A) (McKinney 2018); New York City Tax Rate Schedule, N.Y.
STATE
DEP’T
OF
TAXATION
&
FIN.,
https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/current_forms/it/nyc_tax_rate_schedule.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2018)
(requiring unmarried resident taxpayers with New York taxable income over $50,000 to pay “$1,813
plus 3.876% of excess over $50,000” to New York in New York City income taxes); N.Y. TAX LAW §
601(c)(1)(A) (McKinney 2018); New York State Tax Rate Schedule, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION
& FIN., https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/current_forms/it/it201i_tax_rate_schedule.pdf (last visited Dec. 14,
2018) (requiring unmarried resident taxpayers with New York taxable income between $215,400 and
$1,077,550 to pay “$13,825 plus 6.85% of excess over $215,400” to New York in state income taxes).
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portion of the State income tax.
CONCLUSION
The Court in Wynne relied on the internal consistency test developed
under the fair apportionment prong of Complete Auto to strike down
Maryland’s refusal to grant a credit for income taxes paid to other states
against a purportedly local income tax. In so doing, the Court conflated the
fair apportionment and non-discrimination prongs. Upon a finding of
internal inconsistency, the Court deemed the Maryland income tax scheme
discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional under the dormant
Commerce Clause. The question of whether an internally consistent, and
therefore fairly apportioned, tax may nonetheless discriminate against
interstate commerce was not before the Court in Wynne.
The Court’s discrimination case law and the relevant scholarly
literature demonstrate that an internally consistent tax may nonetheless be
discriminatory. Additionally, the scholarly literature and the Court’s
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, combined with general
principles of international taxation, establish that states taxing income
based on residence must provide a credit for income taxes paid to a source
state to offset the double taxation that may result when two sovereigns
exercise their legitimate taxing authority over the same interstate activity.
Consequently, New York’s refusal to grant a credit for income taxes paid
to other states against the New York City income tax violates the dormant
Commerce Clause.

